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SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL FAUX PAS
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,
110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990)
Michael K. Graves
I. INTRODUCTION
The problems and tragedies attributable to drunken driving1 have been well-
documented since before the advent of motorized vehicles as a mode of personal
1. The United States Senate enacted a Joint Resolution in 1989 designating Labor Day weekend as "National
Drive for Life Weekend" wherein the Senate catalogued the many problems attended with drunken driving:
Whereas drunk driving is the most frequently committed crime in the United States, with arrests for driv-
ing while intoxicated totaling more than three times the number of arrest for all violent crimes combined;
Whereas one individual in the United States was killed every twenty-two minutes in a drunk-driving-re-
lated crash in 1988, an average of sixty-five individuals each day;
Whereas more than twenty-three thousand individuals were killed in the United States in drunk-driving-
related crashes in 1988;
Whereas two out of every five individuals in the United States will be involved in a drunk-driving-related
crash at some point in their lives;
Whereas the estimates of the economic costs of drunk driving in the United States are as high as $24 bil-
lion ....
S.J. RES. 127, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 103 Stat. 561 (1989).
The following statistics compiled by the United States Department of Commerce in 1989 support these findings:
(1) driving while intoxicated was the most frequently arrested for offense in 1988 (1,294,000 persons arrested);
(2) there was a 55 percent increase in the arrest rate for driving under the influence between 1975 and 1985; (3)
20,208 drunken drivers were involved in fatal accidents in 1988, nearly one-third of the total licensed drivers
involved in fatal accidents in 1988. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990 Nos.
298, 1040, 1041 (1990).
A commission composed of industrial leaders, citizen action groups, the media, law enforcement officials, doc-
tors, and congressional and administrative members established by President Ronald Reagan in 1982 to confront
the issue of drunken driving elucidated the realities of these statistical findings:
1. Each year 25,000 people are killed in alcohol related deaths.
2. Each year 1 million drunken driving collisions occur.
3. Over 65 percent of all fatal single-car accidents are alcohol related.
4. Relatively few problem drinkers (about 7 percent of the driving population) account for over 66 percent
of all alcohol related fatal accidents.
5. It is estimated that one out of two Americans will be involved in an alcohol related accident in his or her
lifetime.
6. Motorcyclists and drivers of light vans and trucks are more likely to be DUI than are automobile driv-
ers.
7. Male drivers with previous convictions for DUI are more likely to be drinking than are drivers without
such records.
8. The average drunken driver arrested on the highway has an 0.20 percent blood alcohol concentration
level - fifteen drinks of 86-proof, or a comparable consumption of beer or wine, in four hours for a 180-
pound person-double the level for illegal per se intoxication in forty-one of fifty states.
9. Every year 708,000 persons are injured and 74,000 of these people suffer serious injuries in alcohol
related accidents.
10. Alcohol related collisions are the leading cause of death for young Americans between ages sixteen
and twenty-four.
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11. Although those between ages sixteen and twenty-four comprise only 22 percent of the total popula-
tion licensed to drive, they cause 44 percent of all fatal nighttime alcohol related accidents.
12. Of all fatal alcohol related auto crashes, 80 percent occur between 8:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. On week-
ends as many as 10 percent of all drivers are impaired or drunk. The most dangerous hours are those
between 12:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m.
13. The cost in damages of alcohol related accidents is estimated to be $21 to $24 billion a year. In 1981
serious crimes such as murder, assault, and robbery were estimated to cost $12 to $13 billion.
14. Most Americans drink, and over 80 percent admit to driving after drinking.
15. When drinkers are at the presumed level of intoxication, their risk of causing an accident is six times
greater than that of nondrinking drivers.
16. An accident caused by drunken driving is the most frequent violent crime in the United States today.
J.A. VOLPE, Alcohol and Public Safety, in ALCOHOLISM AND RELATED PROBLEMS 110, 121-22 (1984) [hereinafter
Volpe].
The executive, legislative, and administrative branches of government have not been alone in their recognition of
the drunken driving problem. The judiciary has evidenced cognizance of the problem for several decades. See,
e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) ("The carnage caused by drunken drivers is well docu-
mented and needs no detailed recitation here."); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (noting "traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways"); Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637, 657 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the
death toll of all our wars.") (footnote omitted); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) ("The increasing
slaughter on our highways . . . now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield."); Burg v.
Municipal Court, 673 P.2d 732, 734 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 967 (1984) ("[Tlhe drunk driver cuts a wide
swath of death, pain, grief, and untold physical and emotional injury across the roads of. . . the nation.").
See also Jerome 0. Campane, The Constitutionality of Drunk Driver Roadblocks, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT
BULLETIN, July, 1984, at 24 [hereinafter Campane] ("It has been estimated that on Friday and Saturday nights, I
out of every 10 motor vehicle operators is intoxicated.").
But see Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -U.S.,.. 58 U.S.L.W. 4781,4787 n.7 (June 14,
1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the statistics compiled by the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration in 1988 of traffic fatalities involving intoxicated individuals "include any accidents that might have
been caused by a sober driver but involved an intoxicated person. They also include accidents in which legally
intoxicated pedestrians and bicyclists were killed; such accidents account for 2,180 of the 18,501 total accidents
involving legally intoxicated persons."). Justice Stevens also pointed out that the statistics of drunken driving fa-
talities were inclusive of the intoxicated driver and were thus not merely a reflection of the deaths of innocent
citizens at the hands of the drunken driver:
[I]n 1988 there were 18,501 traffic fatalities involving legally intoxicated persons. If one subtracts from
this number the 10,210 legally intoxicated drivers who were themselves killed in these crashes, there re-
main 8,291 fatalities in which somebody other than the intoxicated driver was killed in an accident in-
volving legally intoxicated persons (this number still includes, however, accidents in which legally
intoxicated pedestrians stepped in front of sober drivers and were killed).
Id. at 4789 n. 17. J. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING, DRIVING AND THE SYMBOLIC
ORDER (1981) (cited in Jacobs & Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion:A Constitutional
and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 595, 635 n. 182 (1985)) ("discussing
how myths, such as 'the killer drunk,' have grown up around drunk driving, and how limited is the data base
underlying what the public and policymakers think they know about drunk driving"); James B. Jacobs & Nadine
Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk
Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 595, 637 (1985) [hereinafter Jacobs & Strossen] ("[D]runk drivers
are unlikely to cause more than a small number of deaths or injuries over the course of a year in any particular
area."); Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Special Report: Drunk Driving 1,2 (1988) [hereinafter
Special Report] (evidencing that the arrest rate for driving under the influence has fallen from 1.8 million in 1986
to approximately 1.3 million in 1988) (see Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990, supra, this note) (copy is
on file with the Mississippi College Law Review); Geoffrey P. Alpert, Establishing Roadblocks to Control the
Drunk Driver-Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 51,53 (1991) [hereinafter Estab-
lishing Roadblocks] (suggesting that research on highway safety has not uncovered the exact effects that alcohol
has on driving); Id. at 54 (" '[Plublic opinion and public policy on drunk driving have been shaped more by per-
ceptions and imagery than by facts.' ") (quoting J. B. Jacobs, Drunk Driving: An American Dilemma at 40
(1989)); Alcohol and Public Safety, supra this note, at 139 ("It is heartening to report that 5,580 fewer Americans
were victims of highway accidents in 1982 compared to 1981 . . . which marks the best record in forty
years . . . . These figures are encouraging, but they indicate that the anti-drunken driving movement cannot be
allowed to stall."); Stacey, Drunken Driving Arrests Have Dropped Since '83, USA Today, Feb. 29, 1988. at 5A,
col. 1.
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transportation in the United States.' Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
deemed the problems attendant with drunken driving worthy ofjudicial notice.3 In
laudable efforts to combat the many problems associated with drunken driving,
new laws have been promulgated4 and new practices implemented' at both the fed-
eral and state levels. One practice implemented in an effort to curb drunken driv-
ing-highway sobriety checkpoints'- however, resulted in substantial discord
2. Alcohol and Public Safety, supra note 1, at 11l. The author observes:
Drinking and driving is by no means a modern-day social happening. Legislative records show that the
combination of the two prompted early laws regarding the manner in which a man drove his horse after
overindulging at the local public house. Furthermore, as early as 1904, one published report cited drink-
ing as the cause of nineteen to twenty-five accidents involving the novel horseless carriages. Fifteen peo-
ple were killed and nearly as many more were injured in these collisions.
Id.
3. "The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here." South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983).
4. See Highway Safety Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1738, 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1982) which conditioned receipt of
certain basic and supplemental federal grants upon states imposing minimum penalties for drunken driving viola-
tions. Illustrative is subsection (e)(1):
For purposes of this section, a State is eligible for a basic grant if such state provides-
(A) for the prompt suspension, for a period of not less than ninety days in the case of a first offender and
not less than one year in the case of any repeat offender, of the driver's license of any individual who a law
enforcement officer has probable cause under State law to believe has committed an alcohol-related traf-
fic offense, and (i) to whom is administered one or more chemical tests to determine whether the individ-
ual was intoxicated while operating the motor vehicle and who is determined, as a result of such tests, to
be intoxicated, or (ii) who refuses to submit to such a test as proposed by the officer;
(B) for a mandatory sentence, which shall not be subject to suspension or probation, of (i) imprison-
ment for not less than forty-eight consecutive hours, or (ii) not less than ten days of community service,
of any person convicted of driving while intoxicated more than once in any five-year period;
(C) that any person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater when driving a motor vehicle
shall be deemed to be driving while intoxicated; and
(D) for increased efforts or resources dedicated to the enforcement of alcohol-related traffic laws and
increased efforts to inform the public of such enforcement.
For a representative sample of federal and state legislation see Richard A. Ifft, Note, Curbing the Drunk
Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L.i. 1457 an. 1-3
(1983) [hereinafter Curbing the Drunk Driver].
See also SpecialReport, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing effect of ratification of the 26th Amendment and federal
highway funds legislation on changes of alcohol-related legislation); Alcohol and Public Safety, supra note 1, at
139 ("[In 1983] over 763 bills on alcohol legislation were introduced and 129 enacted in 39 states-almost double
the 378 introduced in 1982.").
5. See Jeffrey J. Bouslog, Note, Exploring the Constitutional Limits of Suspicionless Seizures: The Use of
Roadblocks to Apprehend Drunken Drivers, 71 IowA L. Rav. 577 n.3 (1986) (noting the recent trend of new law
enforcement strategies and describing a drunken driving program utilizing sobriety checkpoints) [hereinafter Ex-
ploring the Constitutional Limits]. See generally Alcohol and Public Safety, supra note 1, at 139 ("In fiscal year
1983, some 38 percent of Section 402 highway funds ...was allocated to drunken driving programs.").
6. Highway sobriety checkpoints are also classified as intoxication roadblocks, sobriety roadblocks, drunk
driving roadblocks, drunken driving roadblocks, alcohol safety action program roadblocks, DUI roadblocks, and
DWI roadblocks. For purposes of this note, all roadblocks established to apprehend drunken drivers will be re-
ferred to as "sobriety checkpoints."
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among the states.7 States invalidating use of sobriety checkpoints by law enforce-
ment officials viewed ulitization of these checkpoints" as unreasonable seizures in
violation of the strictures of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,9 while states permitting employment of the checkpoints found the check-
points on a constitutional par with both the respective state and federal
7. Among those jurisdictions having considered the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints, the following
jurisdictions found the checkpoints violative of constitutional standards: State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court,
663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983); Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Henderson, 756
P.2d 1057 (Idaho 1988); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Parms, 523 So.
2d 1293 (La. 1988); State v. Crom, 383 N.W2d 461 (Neb. 1986); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985);
State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221 (Pa. 1985);
State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1988), rev'g
Fury v. City of Seattle, 730 P.2d 62 (Wash. 1986).
Compare with Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987); State v. Golden, 318 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1984);
People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d 880 (I11. 1985), rev'g, 466 N.E.2d 346 (111. 1984); State v. Garcia, 481 N.E.2d
148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660
S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Church, 530 So. 2d 1235 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Little v. State,
479 A.2d 903 (Md. 1984); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (Mass. 1985); State v. Coccomo, 427
A.2d 131 (N.J. 1980); City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 735 P. 2d 1161 (N.M. 1987); People v. Scott, 473
N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984); Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d 692 (Or. 1987); State v. Martin, 496 A.2d 442 (Vt.
1985); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1985).
8. For a discussion of various methods utilized in employing sobriety checkpoints see Curbing the Drunk
Driver, supra note 4, at 1460 n. 16.
A safety study conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board found that the typical sobriety check-
point consisted of the following features:
1) Police agencies select the times of operation and locations of checkpoints, based on empirical evidence
of high DWI activity or alcohol-related crashes.
2) Checkpoint sites are established with high visibility, including warning signs, flashing lights, flares,
police vehicles, and the presence of uniformed officers.
3) Police officers conducting the checkpoint either stop all traffic or use some preestablished, nonbiased
formula to decide which vehicles to stop; for example, every tenth vehicle.
4) After being stopped, a motorist may be requested to produce a driver's license or vehicle registration
and is asked questions while the officer looks for signs of alcohol impairment. In some cases where li-
cense/registration checks are not made, the stop is very brief (15 to 30 seconds).
5) Based on his or her observations, the police officer either waves the motorist on or directs him or her to
a secondary area for further investigation. In the latter case, a roadside psychomotor test (e.g., walking a
straight line) or a breath-alcohol test is usually requested.
6) If the driver fails these tests and the officer has probable cause, the motorist is arrested for DWI.
7) The arrested driver is then transported to the station for booking and is requested to submit to an evi-
dential breath-alcohol test. Refusal to submit to such a test invokes the State's implied consent penalties.
National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Study, Deterrence of Drunk Driving: The Role of Sobriety Check-
points and Administrative License Revocations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 1984 [hereinafter Safety
Study]. Copy is on file with the Mississippi College Law Review.
9. The Fourth Amendment guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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constitutions.1" These divergent views among the jurisdictions were only ampli-
fied by scholars addressing the issue.11
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,"2 the United States Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of highway sobriety checkpoints and de-
cided that randomly-selected highway sobriety checkpoints did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.13 This note will focus on the Court's constitutional analysis
of sobriety checkpoints and the foundation upon which its opinion rests. The note
will consider whether sobriety checkpoints should be deemed an additional excep-
tion to the traditional requirements of the Fourth Amendment and will also ad-
dress the alarming repercussions which further erosion of basic Fourth
Amendment guarantees may have upon individual liberties.
10. See supra note 7.
11. For a representative sample of scholars supporting the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints see Ann
M. Overbeck, Comment, A Sobering Look at the Constitutionality of DUI Roadblocks, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 579
(1985) [hereinafterA Sobering Look] (the Fourth Amendment balancing analysis supports the constitutionality of
sobriety checkpoints); Curbing the Drunk Driver, supra note 4 (sobriety checkpoints are an effective and constitu-
tional tool for DWI enforcement); Carol Gibson Westendorf & Roger Westendorf, Comment, The Prouse Dicta:
From Random Stops to Sobriety Checkpoints?, 20 IDAHO L. REv. 127, 152 (1984) [hereinafter The Prouse Dicta]
(sobriety checkpoints may be invalid and unconstitutional as applied by enforcement agencies but are not per se
invalid under the Fourth Amendment); Mark R. Soble, Comment, Clearing the Roadblocks to Sobriety Check-
points, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 489 (1988) [hereinafter Clearing the Roadblocks] (sobriety checkpoints are consti-
tutional as adminstrative searches under Camara v. Municipal Court); M.A. Berenson, Note, State v. Parms:
The Constitutionality of DWI Checkpoints in Louisiana -A Roadblock for Roadblocks, 63 TUL. L. REv. 734
(1989) (roadblock should be constitutional if conducted according to established guidelines); Scott R. Phillips,
Comment, DWI Roadblocks: Are They Constitutional in North Carolina?, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 779 (1986)
[hereinafter DWI Roadblocks] (sobriety checkpoints satisfy the test established in Brown v. Texas); Jeffrey
Eugene Jones, Note, The Constitutionality of Sobriety Checkpoints, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1469 (1985) (sobri-
ety checkpoints are constitutional); Note, Designing Constitutional Sobriety Roadblocks: A Comparative Study
Using the Model in Fury v. City of Seattle and State v. Deskins, 24 WILLIAMETTE L. REv. 129 (1988) [hereinafter
Designing Constitutional Sobriety Roadblocks] (sobriety checkpoints would be constitutional if operated in adher-
ence to certain criteria).
Compare with Jacobs & Strossen, supra note I (regardless of the procedures utilized in operating the sobriety
checkpoint, the checkpoint may still be violative of the Fourth Amendment); Randall J. Fons, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 109 (1986) (DUI roadblocks fail the objec-
tive balancing test established in Brown v. Texas because of their intrusiveness and the availability of alternative
methods to control drunken driving); Exploring the ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 5 (sobriety checkpoints are
unconstitutional because there are more effective alternative methods); Lazaro Fernandez, Comment, DUI
Roadblocks: Drunk Drivers Take a Toll on the Fourth Amendment, 19 JOHN MARSHALL L. REv. 983, 986 (1986)
[hereinafter Toll on the Fourth Amendment] ("[B]ecause there exist methods to advance the public interest without
the wholesale seizure of thousands of motorists, DUI roadblocks unduly interfere with the traveling public's right
under the fourth amendment to be free from unreasonable seizure."); Clark H. Cameron, Note, Ingersoll v.
Palmer: Have Sobriety Checkpoints Driven the Fourth Amendment Too Far?, 17 Sw. U.L. REv. 261 (1987) [here-
inafter Have Sobriety Checkpoints Driven the Fourth Amendment Too Far?] (sobriety checkpoints ignore the
standard of reasonable suspicion required for governmental intrusion and are, therefore, unconstitutional);
Steven P. Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protection, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123
(1984) [hereinafter Grossman] (sobriety checkpoints are unconstitutional because the absence of requiring par-
ticularized suspicion causes the checkpoints to fail the Fourth Amendment's test of reasonableness); William P.
Weiner & Michael D. McCullough, Sobriety Checkpoints in Michigan: Balancing Sobriety and Propriety Under
the Fourth Amendment, 4 COOLEY L. REv. 247, 271 (1987) [hereinafter Weiner and McCullough] ("[A] blanket
inspection of every driver, or every third driver, is an unreasonable search and seizure.").
12. __ U.S. , I10S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
13. Id. at 4784.
1991]
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State of Michigan established the Michigan Drunk Driving Task Force in
the Department of State Police14 and charged the Task Force with studying all as-
pects of the drunk driving problem in Michigan." Included in the recommenda-
tions of the Task Force's final report submitted in September, 1985, was the
implementation of sobriety checkpoints on public highways.' 6 The State Police
chose not to implement the sobriety checkpoints at that time, however, because of
existing legislative opposition.17
After being directed by Governor Blanchard in his State of the State Address on
January 29, 1986, to implement'a sobriety checkpoint program,18 the director of
the Michigan Department of State Police appointed a Sobriety Checkpoint Advi-
sory Committee19 to establish guidelines" for the operation of these checkpoints,
site selection, and publicity of the checkpoints.21
The first and only sobriety checkpoint22 implemented under this program prior
to the challenge to the constitutional validity of sobriety checkpoints was con-
ducted at Dixie Highway and Gretchen Road in Saginaw County on May 17 and
18, 1986.23 During the one hour-and-fifteen-minute operation, in which the Sa-
ginaw County Sheriffs Department cooperated, 126 vehicles passed through the
checkpoint with each vehicle being detained for approximately twenty-five sec-
onds or less.2 Two drivers were further detained for field sobriety testing which
resulted in the arrest of one of the two drivers for driving under the influence.2" A
third driver, who had driven through the checkpoint without stopping and was sub-
sequently pulled over by an officer in an observation vehicle, was also arrested for
driving under the influence.2"
14. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625j; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.9325(10). Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429
N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. 1988).




19. The Committee consisted of representatives of the state and local police forces, state prosecutors, and the
University of Michigan Transportation Research institute. Id.
20. The guidelines also included "briefing, scheduling, safety considerations, motorist contact, staffing and
assignment of duties." Id.
21.
Under the program, checkpoints would be established at certain sites along state highways. All motor-
ists would be stopped upon reaching a checkpoint and would be examined for signs of intoxication.
Should the examining officer find indications of intoxication, the officer would direct the driver to an out-
of-traffic location, check the driver's license and car registration, and possibly conduct further sobriety
tests, including a Breathalyzer test. If the officer concluded that the driver was intoxicated, the officer
would have discretion to arrest the driver; should the officer conclude the driver was not intoxicated, the
driver was to be released.
Id.
22. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2484 (1990).






The plaintiffs/respondents, licensed drivers in the State of Michigan,27 com-
menced this action in the Circuit Court of Wayne County28 on May 16, 1986,29
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from potential subjection to the sobriety
checkpoints."o During pre-trial proceedings, the Michigan State Police Depart-
ment agreed to delay further implementation of the sobriety checkpoint program
until resolution of the case.31 The circuit court found that, although there was stat-
utory authority permitting implementation of the sobriety checkpoints,32 the
checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution33
and article 1, section 11 of the Michigan Constitution.3" Petitioners -the Michi-
gan State Police Department and its Director- appealed this decision to the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals challenging both conclusions of the trial court regarding the
constitutional infringements. 3
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that
the sobriety checkpoints were violative of the Fourth Amendment but found it un-
necessary to consider whether the sobriety checkpoints violated the Michigan
Constitution.3 ' The court, noting that the trial court applied the appropriate test to
determine the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoints, 37 held that the trial
court's findings38 of fact were not clearly erroneous.
27. The Plaintiffs/Respondents were not detained or in any way directly involved with the operation of the
challenged sobriety checkpoint. The Respondents' standing was evidently based on the allegation that each "is a
licensed driver in the State of Michigan . . . who regularly travel[s] throughout the State in [their] automo-
bile[s]." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2484 (citing Complaint, App. 3a-4a).
28. 110 S. Ct. at 2484.
29. 429 N.W.2d at 181.
30. 110 S. Ct. at 2484.
31. 429 N.W.2d at 181.
32. Id. The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Michigan does not reveal the basis of the statutory authoriza-
tion.
33. See supra note 9.
34. 429 N.W.2d at 181-82.
35. Id. at 182.
36. Id. at 185 ("We find it unnecessary to consider this issue because art. 1, sec. II offers at least the same
protection as accorded by the Fourth Amendment and we have already found the checkpoint program to be an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.").
37.
The trial court employed the Brown test, balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by
drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion
on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints. The parties to this appeal agree, as do we, that the




In concluding that sobriety checkpoints were not an effective means of combating drunk driving, the
trial court found: (1) the degree to which a sobriety checkpoint program would deter drunk driving was
directly related to the program's success in achieving actual arrests; (2) sobriety checkpoints were not an
effective means of actually apprehending drunk drivers; and (3) the statistical data and testimony pre-
sented at trial demonstrated, at most, a short-term deterrent effect.
Id. at 183.
39. Id. (citing MCR 2.613(c)).
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The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari4" to determine
"whether a State's use of highway sobriety checkpoints violates the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."41 In reversing the
Michigan Court of Appeals' decision, the Court agreed that Brown v. Texas42 pro-
vided the appropriate analytical framework upon which to determine the constitu-
tionality of sobriety checkpoints,' but found that the evidence adduced at the trial
level, when utilized in the Brown analysis, supported upholding the sobriety
checkpoints as reasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment."
III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment4" is to protect the "privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."46 A histori-
40. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 46 (U.S. Mich., Oct. 2, 1989) (No. 88-1897).
41. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2483 (1990).
42. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
43. 110 S. Ct. at 2484.
44. Id. at 2485.
45. The text of the Fourth Amendment may be found supra note 9.
46. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
[Vol. 12:231
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cal review of the actions prompting passage of the Fourth Amendment47 and sub-
sequentjudicial decisions construing the Fourth Amendment" clearly reveals that
47. There is general agreement that the foundation for the passage of the Fourth Amendment was laid by
James Otis' oration in the case of "Writs of Assistance" (Paxton's Case) in 1761. Otis was retained by colonial
merchants to contest the Crown's authorization of writs of assistance to royal customs officials to enforce revenue
measures. See JULIUS MARKE, VIGNETTES OF LEGAL HISTORY (1965)[hereinafter MARKE]; 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF
JOHN ADAMS (L. Wroth & H. Zobel ed. 1968) (General Correspondence and Other Papers of the Adams States-
men No. 3)[hereinafter LEGAL PAPERS]. The colonists recognized that special writs issued upon probable cause
were legal, LEGAL PAPERS, supra at 141, but contested the general exercise of arbitrary power authorized by the
general writs of assistance:
The Writ was particularly vicious in that it was so general and arbitrary. No special writ of search, issued
on sworn testimony that the smuggled goods were concealed in a definite place, was needed. The Writ
was not returnable to the court after execution but rather continued in effect indefinitely, until the demise
of the reigning monarch and for six months thereafter, as a license to search and seize uncustomed goods
anywhere. The official in possession of the writ therefore had absolute and unlimited discretion in its exe-
cution.
MARKE, supra at 246.
Perhaps the sentiment of the colonists towards these writs was most forcefully expressed by Otis before the Supe-
rior Court:
And I take this opportunity to declare, that whether under a fee or not, (for in such a cause as this I despise
a fee) I will to my dying day oppose, with all the powers and faculties God has given me, all such instru-
ments of slavery on the one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ of assistance is. It appears to
me . . . the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the funda-
mental principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an English law-book.
LEGAL PAPERS, supra at 139-40 (footnotes omitted).
The position taken by Jeremiah Gridley, counsel for the Crown before the Superior Court, was "clear-cut. Parlia-
ment . . . empowered the Exchequer to issue 'writs of assistance'; authority showed these to be general writs
.... If the practice seemed to infringe upon individual liberties, there were ample English and colonial prece-
dents for such infringements in the name of the exigencies of collecting the revenue." Id. at 114. As history re-
veals through violent revolution, Gridley's position prevailed.
See also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) ("An important forerunner of the first 10 Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, the Virginia Bill of Rights, specifically opposed 'general warrants,
whereby an officer ... may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed.' ")
(citation omitted); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977) ("It cannot be doubted that the Fourth
Amendment's commands grew in large measure out of the colonists' experiences with the writs of assistance and
their memories of the general warrants formerly in use in England.") id. at 7-8; United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 328-29 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Tihe tyrannical invasions [stemming
from nameless warrants] have been recognized as the primary abuses which ensured the Warrant Clause a promi-
nent place in our Bill of Rights."). Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) ("Vivid in the memory of the
newly independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of
the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists."). Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) ("[T]he writs of
assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, . . . perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police
to arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of 'probable
cause' before a magistrate was required."). Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) ("[Tihe events
which took place in England immediately following the argument about writs of assistance in Boston, were fresh
in the memories of those who achieved our independence and established our form of government.").
See generally Grossman, supra note 11; Paul Gronson, Note, The Right of Privacy and Due Process of Law, 3
BUFFALO L. REv. 283 (1954); Note, The "Probable Cause"Requirement for Search Warrants, 46 HARv. L. REv.
1307 (1933) [hereinafter The "Probable Cause" Requirement]; Wood, The Scope of Constitutional Immunity
Against Searches & Seizures, 34 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1927) [hereinafter Wood]; Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the
Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603 (1982) [hereinafter Grano].
48. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977) ("Although the searches and seizures which
deeply concerned the colonists, and which were foremost in the minds of the Framers, were those involving inva-
sions of the home, it would be a mistake to conclude . . that the Warrant Clause was therefore intended to
guard only against intrusions into the home."); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,455 (1971) ("[T]he
values [of the Fourth Amendment] were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. In times
not altogether unlike our own they won . . . a right of personal security against arbitrary intrusion by official
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power."); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) ("[The Fourth Amendment] reflect[s] the determination
of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the people of this new Nation should forever 'be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects' from intrusion and seizure by officers acting under the unbridled authority of a gen-
eral warrant."); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959) ("IT]he early American decisions both before
and immediately after [the adoption of the Fourth Amendment] show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or
even 'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest. And that principle has survived to
this day.") (footnotes omitted); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is
to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886):
While the framers of the constitution had their attention drawn . . . to the abuses of this power of search-
ing private houses and seizing private papers, . . .it is obvious that they only intended to restrain the
abuse, while they did not abolish the power. Hence it is only unreasonable searches and seizures that are
forbidden, and the means of securing this protection was by abolishing searches under warrants, which
were called general warrants, because they authorized searches in any place, for any thing.
Id. at 641 (Miller, J., concurring).
SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS
the amendment was designed to limit all searches and seizures by government of-
ficials.4" Significantly, "[t]his inestimable right of personal security belongs as
much to the citizen on the streets . . . as to the homeowner closeted in his study to
dispose of his secret affairs ."" Thus, the Fourth Amendment encompasses all sei-
zures of the person, including investigative seizures that involve only a brief deten-
tion and are not equivalent to a traditional arrest."1 Furthermore, the warrant
clause of the Fourth Amendment provides additional constitutional safeguards.
Subsequent judicial decisions, however, have substantially reduced these limi-
tations of the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment
by construction of a number of "jealously and carefully drawn"5 3 exceptions54 and
recognition of "certain carefully defined classes of cases" 5 in which there is an ex-
ception to these requirements. The most famous of these "carefully drawn" excep-
tions is found in Terry v. Ohio 6 in the context of police encounters with private
citizens and investigation through "stop and frisk." 7 The Terry Court recognized
that "stop and frisk" was synonymous with "search and seizure" for Fourth
49. See generally JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 26, 177-
78 (1972) [hereinafter COOK]; Grossman, supra note I1; The "Probable Cause"Requirement, supra note 47, at
1308-09; Toll on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 986.
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,8-9 (1968).
51. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19.
52.
Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment,
translation of the abstract prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" into workable guide-
lines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task .. . .Nevertheless, one governing principle,
justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it
has been authorized by a valid search warrant.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (citations omitted).
53. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
54.
It is true that there have been some exceptions to the warrant requirement .. . .But those exceptions are
few in number and carefully delineated . . . ; in general, they serve the legitimate needs of law enforce-
ment officers to protect their own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction. Even while carving
out those exceptions, the Court has reaffirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure ...."
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968)) (citations omitted).
55. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978), the Court opined that the liquor and firearms industries fell within this certain class of cases in which
there was no "reasonable expectation of privacy" and, thus, no search warrant was required prior to a search of
these businesses. "The element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of
close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware."
Id. at 313.
56. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
57. In Terry, a police officer approached three citizens whom the officer had observed engaging in conduct
which the officer believed was a preface to a hold-up. Upon approaching the suspects, the officer identified him-
self and asked the suspects their names. After the suspects "mumbled something," the officer grabbed one of the
men and patted down the outside of his garments. The officer felt what he believed to be a handgun, but he could
not remove it so he ushered the men into a nearby store where he obtained the handgun from underneath the
defendant's garments. The officer also found a handgun on one of the other suspects but did not have to breach his
outer garments to obtain it. The two men were later charged with carrying concealed weapons and moved to sup-
press the evidence of the handguns on the grounds that the evidence was the fruit of an unlawful search. Id. at 5-
8.
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Amendment purposes.5 8 The Court found, however, that police conduct necessi-
tated by on-the-spot observations by the officer was not properly subject to the
Fourth Amendment warrant procedure59 but, rather, to be gauged by determining
the reasonableness of the conduct by balancing the involved governmental interest
with the severity of the attendant intrusion.6" The Court then reasoned that the
governmental interest in these police encounters was two-fold: (1) the investiga-
tion of crime, and (2) self-protection of the police officer.61 In comparison, the
Court found that the resulting intrusion on the individual citizen, given the "tradi-
tional limitations upon the scope of searches, 62 was outweighed by the counter-
vailing governmental interests.63 However, "in justifying the particular intrusion
the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion. "'64 The Terry Court explained that the existence of "specific and articula-
ble facts" was imperative so that these facts could be judged against an objective
standard65 when the "reasonableness" of a particular search or seizure was later
subjected to the detached, neutral scrutiny of a magistrate.6 6
The adoption by the Terry Court of a reasonableness balancing standard in lieu
of probable cause or a warrant in reviewing police conduct illustrates but one of the
numerous "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions67 which the Supreme Court
has constructed to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Consideration of other exceptions and the reasoning underlying
their development is necessary to ascertain the impact of these exceptions on "con-
58. Id. at 16.
59. Id. at 20.
60. Id. at 21.
61. ld. at 23-24.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. The objective standard to be utilized in determining the "reasonableness" of a particular search or sei-
zure is whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search [would] 'warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate[?]" Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted)
(footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 21. The Terry Court left no doubt as to whether a search or seizure based on less than probable cause
must, nevertheless, at some point be subject to judicial review:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the
conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny
of ajudge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.
Id. (footnote omitted).
67. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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ventional""8 Fourth Amendment analysis6" and the role which these exceptions
have played in the Court's continued development and enlargement of the reason-
ableness balancing test -the apparent touchstone of contemporary Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence."0
B. Administrative Searches
"Inspection by administrative officials of private premises in order to deter-
mine their condition or use is a long-standing if not time-honored component of
the American scene."7" These searches, though initially utilized primarily for the
prevention of fire and of the spread of disease, expanded in use by municipalities
to enforce a myriad of municipal regulations deemed necessary for the public wel-
fare. Inspections required for the effective enforcement of these regulations were
typically performed by personnel of local agencies who were ordinarily provided
authorization to enter private premises for purposes of the inspection through pro-
visions in local ordinances and without prior judicial approval.72 Additionally,
"[tihe inspector's right of entry [was] usually buttressed by a city ordinance mak-
ing refusal to admit an authorized inspector a violation punishable by fine or im-
prisonment."" This right of entry by public officials for inspection without prior
judicial approval, however, was challenged in 1965.
1. The Camara Decision
In Camara v. Municipal Court,74 an inspector of the Division of Housing In-
spection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health, making a routine an-
68. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257,258 (1984)
[hereinafter Wasserstrom].
69. A conventional analysis of the Fourth Amendment includes three essential elements:
(1) the warrant requirement: that except in a few specifically established and well-delineated situations,
the police must obtain a particularized warrant from a "neutral and detached"judicial officer before they
search or seize, (2) the probable cause requirement: that the police must have a fixed quantum of evi-
dence-enough to establish probable cause-to justify most searches and seizures, whether made with or
without a warrant; and (3) a definition of"searches and seizures," the Fourth Amendment's critical trig-
gering phrase[,] capacious enough to include non-trespassory invasions of privacy by wiretapping and
electronic surveillance and the exercise by the police of even minimally coercive restraint over the per-
son.
Wasserstrom, supra note 68, at 258-59 (footnotes omitted).
70. The birth of "reasonableness" as the touchstone for Fourth Amendment review of searches and seizures
may be found in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, the Court held that ascertaining
the "reasonableness" of particular conduct under the Fourth Amendment could only be accomplished by balanc-
ing the need for the particular official conduct with the attendant intrusion upon individual liberties. Id. at 536-
37. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. The "balancing test" is best explicated in Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47 (1979), in the consideration of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment: "Consideration of the constitu-
tionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the de-
gree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty."
Id. at 50-51. This reasonableness balancing test has similarly been applied to searches. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20-21 (1968) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)).
7 1. Wayne R. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967
SuP. CT. Rav. I [hereinafter LaFave].
72. Id. at 1-2.
73. Id. at 2.
74. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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nual inspection, was informed by an apartment building manager that Camara, a
lessee in the building, utilized the rear portion of his apartment as a personal resi-
dence. Use of the apartment for residential purposes violated the building's occu-
pancy permit, and the inspector demanded Camara to permit an inspection of his
apartment. Camara refused entrance to the inspector, however, because the in-
spector did not have a search warrant. Police arrested Camara for his continued
refusal to permit a lawful inspection. Camara then brought suit alleging that the
ordinance authorizing the inspections was unconstitutional, an issue upon which
the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari.
The Camara Court considered two proffered justifications75 for these warrant-
less inspections and found neither persuasive. The first contention considered in
defense of the warrantless inspections was that the inspections were authorized by
ordinances containing sufficient safeguards for individual interests and, addition-
ally, that an individual inspector's decision to enter a premise, even without a war-
rant, must satisfy the constitutional standard of reasonableness.76 The Court,
however, felt that this argument overlooked the "purpose behind the warrant ma-
chinery"77 of the Fourth Amendment. The individual, upon demand of entry by
the inspector, "has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code
involved requires inspection of his premises, . . . the lawful limits of the inspec-
tor's power to search, and . . . whether the inspector himself is acting under
proper authorization,"'78 all "questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magis-
trate without any reassessment of the basic agency decision to canvass an area."79
The Court found that the practical effect of such a system was to leave individual
rights "subject to the discretion of the official in the field"8" and concluded that
"broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particu-
larly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of criminal penalty. 8
The Court next considered the extent to which the public interest demands war-
rantless administrative searches82 by virtue of the fact that there was no more ef-
fective means of enforcing necessary minimum public health standards other than
by "routine systematized inspection of all physical structures."' The Court dis-
pelled the "public interest" argument by noting that there was no question as to
whether the searches may be made but, rather, whether the searches may be made
75. A third, additional justification advanced for the warrantless inspections was appended to that portion of
the opinion wherein the Court considered itself to be addressing the "first" argument in defense of these inspec-
tions. Id. at 530-31; see infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. This justification was that "the warrant process
could not function effectively in this field." Id. at 532. Though taking notice of this defense at this point of the
opinion, the Court actually only addresses this defense later in the Court's consideration of the defendant's "sec-
ond" argument, so enumerated by the Court. Id.; see infr notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 531.









without a warrant. The Court held that determinative of this second, more rele-
vant inquiry was whether "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search."84 The Court concluded that there
had been no evidence that these administrative searches could not be effectively
performed within a reasonable search warrant requirement.8 5 Nevertheless, the
Court recognized that, because of the unique nature of these inspections, there
may be required "some other accommodation between public need and individual
rights .... "86 The Court, rejecting the argument that the right of entry to inspect
should be predicated upon a warrant issued only upon probable cause that a partic-
ular dwelling contained violations, 7 held that probable cause for these types of
searches would be satisfied based upon reasonable standards including such fac-
tors as the "passage of time, the nature of the building, . . . or the condition of the
entire area."88 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that these administra-
tive inspections of all structures were "the only effective way to seek universal
compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal codes.""9 Having
thus prefaced its test of reasonableness, the Court opined that the only test for de-
termining reasonableness was "by balancing the need to search against the inva-
sion which the search entails." 90
Therefore, the Court rejected the notion that inspectors must have specific
knowledge of violations in a particular building to establish probable cause for is-
suance of a warrant, and held that "reasonableness is . . . the ultimate standard""1
for assessing probable cause. Thus, though yet requiring a warrant based upon
probable cause for an administrative search absent the occupant's consent or exi-
gent circumstances, 2 the Camara Court reduced the traditional standard of proba-
ble cause9 3 to a test of "reasonableness" in the context of administrative searches.
2. Camara's Progeny - The Border Search Cases and Beyond
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 534.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 538.
89. Id. at 535.
90. Id. at 537. The "persuasive factors" utilized by the Court in its balancing test include:
First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance . . . . Second, the public in-
terest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other can-
vassing technique would achieve acceptable results . . . . Finally, because the inspections are neither
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited inva-
sion of the . . . citizen's privacy.
Id.
91. Id. at 539.
92. Id. at 540.
93. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), has been frequently cited as providing elucidation of the
traditional standard of probable cause: "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the offi-
cers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Id. at 175-76
(quoting in part from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1928)).
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The Camara Court's reasoning has been utilized to examine the constitutional-
ity of other regulatory programs involving both searches and seizures. The Cam-
ara test of reasonableness was first considered in the context of vehicular
detentions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.94
The Almeida-Sanchez Court, while recognizing the serious problem of deter-
ring the entry of illegal aliens,95 held that searches conducted without consent or
probable cause following a stop made by a roving border patrol98 were unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment.97 In so ruling, the Court rejected the govern-
ment's contention that these searches were analogous to the Camara
administrative inspections which could be made on less than a traditional showing
of probable cause. The Court found that "[t]he search ...was conducted in the
unfettered discretion of the members of the Border Patrol, who did not have a war-
rant, probable cause, or consent"98 and that it was precisely this type of situation
which the Camara Court sought to prevent in requiring a warrant prior to inspec-
tion.9
In United States v. Ortiz,' ° the Court considered the constitutionality of
searches conducted at fixed immigration checkpoints removed from the border. 
101
The government forwarded two grounds upon which to justify dispensing with the
requirement of probable cause at these checkpoints despite the Court's decision in
Almeida-Sanchez: (1) the location of the checkpoint was based upon specified cri-
teria and determined by high-level officials, thus reducing the checkpoint officers'
discretion in determining which vehicles to stop,1"2 and (2) a checkpoint stop and
search was far less intrusive than a roving border patrol stop because motorists
could see that all vehicles were being stopped, there were visible signs of the offi-
cers' authority, and there was less likelihood that the motorist would become
frightened or annoyed.' 03 The Ortiz Court recognized that the distinction between
a roving patrol and a checkpoint might be significant in determining the constitu-
tionality of the "seizure" involved, but held dispositive the issue of "search," which
the Court found indistinguishable in either context. Therefore, the Ortiz Court
ruled, in accord with Almeida-Sanchez's rejection of Camara's reasonableness
analysis, searches may not be conducted at fixed immigration checkpoints without
consent or probable cause.
94. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
95. Id. at 273.
96. The roving border patrol stops in issue occurred approximately 25 miles north of the national boundary.
Id. at 268. The ensuing search was conducted without consent or probable cause. Id. at 273.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 270.
99. Id.
100. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
101. The immigration checkpoint under consideration was located on the principal highway between Los
Angeles and San Diego and sixty-six miles north of the Mexican border. Id. at 893.
102. Id. at 894.
103. Id. at 894-95.
104. Id. at 896-97.
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In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,' the Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutionality of random stops made by roving border patrols. Recognizing the strong
public interest in deterring the entry of illegal aliens 6 and the "modest" intrusion
of the investigative stops, '0 the Court nevertheless held that random stops by rov-
ing patrols were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.10 8 The Court did,
however, rule that because of the limited nature of the intrusion, these stops may
be justified on facts amounting to less than probable cause for an arrest.10 9 The
Court then found that the sole fact that the occupants appeared to be of Mexican
ancestry did not justify a reasonable belief that the occupants were illegal aliens
and, thus, did not provide reasonable grounds upon which to stop the vehicle.110
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte111 provided the Court an opportunity to resolve
an issue which it did not address in Ortiz, 112 the constitutionality of the "seizure" at
permanent immigration checkpoints without any individualized suspicion that a
particular vehicle was transporting illegal aliens or without prior authorization by
a judicial warrant.113 The Court began its analysis by recognizing that "checkpoint
stops are 'seizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."'114 In consider-
ing the necessity of reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to a valid stop at a per-
manent checkpoint, the Court determined that this was to be decided by balancing
the interests at stake.11 In holding that reasonable suspicion was not a necessary
predicate to routine stops at permanent checkpoints,116 the Court found that such a
requirement "would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens."117 Thus, given the public interest
in detecting illegal aliens, the impracticality of a requirement of reasonable suspi-
cion in protecting this interest, and the "limited" intrusion118 on Fourth Amend-
105. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
106. Id. at 878-79.
107. The stops by the roving patrols lasted less than one minute, visual inspection was limited to that which
could be seen by officers standing alongside the vehicle and no search of the vehicle nor its occupants was permit-
ted, and the occupants were only required to answer a few questions and possibly produce documentation of their
citizenship. Id. at 880.
108. Id. at 883.
109. Id. at 880. "Except at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles
only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reason-
ably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Id. at 884.
110. Id. at 885-87.
111. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
112. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
113. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545.
114. Id. at 556.
115. Id.
116. The government in Martinez-Fuerte identified routine stops at permanent checkpoints "as the most impor-
tant of the traffic-checking operations." Id.
117. Id. at 557.
118. The Court felt that the reasonableness of the procedural safeguards utilized at the checkpoints assured
only minimal intrusion to motorists. Id. at 562.
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ment interests,1 1 9 the Court relied upon the Camara balancing test120 and
concluded that "the government interests outweighed those of the private citi-
zen."121
The Martinez-Fuerte Court, however, was also confronted with the argument
that Camara required an area warrant, absent consent, even though there was no
requirement that cause exists to believe that there were violations in any particular
building searched. 122 The Court dismissed this argument by differentiating be-
tween the "types" of seizures involved. First, the Court found that the degree of
intrusion associated with the search of a house could not be equated to the "minor
interference with privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning .... 123
Second, the Fourth Amendment protections which Camara sought to achieve in a
warrant requirement 124 were adequately provided by the "visible manifestations of
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint . . 12 Third, the concern that hind-
sight may distort the reasonableness of the seizure was not present in checkpoint
stops where reasonableness is dependent upon such factors as location and method
of operation and "therefore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the
absence of a warrant."12 6 Fourth, the need to substitute the judgment of the seizing
officer with the judgment of a neutral, detached magistrate is diminished when
the decision to seize is made by higher ranking officials and not left to the discre-
tion of the field officer.127 Therefore, based upon the different interests sought to
be served by a warrant requirement in Camara than those in relation to fixed
checkpoint stops, the Court held that Camara is not an "apt model" 128 upon which
to base a requirement of an area warrant upon permanent checkpoints. Thus, the
Court held that the principal protection of Fourth Amendment rights at permanent
checkpoints was a sufficient limitation on the scope of the seizure, and neither
reasonable suspicion nor a judicial warrant was required.129
Following the series of border search cases, the Supreme Court next considered
whether it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to stop a vehicle for a li-
cense and vehicle registration check without probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion that the vehicle was being operated in violation of any law or that any of the
vehicle's occupants were subject to seizure in connection with any other viola-
tion." 0 In Delaware v. Prouse, "' the Court analogized these stops to the roving
119. Id. at 557-58.
120. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
121. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561.
122. Id. at 564.
123. Id. at 565.
124. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
125. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565.
126. Id. at 565-66.
127. Id. at 566.
128. Id. at 564-65.
129. Id. at 566-67.
130. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,650 (1979).
131. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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border patrol stops in Brignoni-Ponce132 and found that the discretionary spot
checks, given the existence of more effective alternatives for enforcing vehicle
regulations, 13 3 were not sufficiently effective to outweigh the resulting intrusion
on Fourth Amendment interests. 134 In dictum, 135 however, the Prouse Court
opined that this ruling did not preclude states from developing other methods for
spot checks of licensing and registration documents which involved less intrusion
and were not dependent upon "unconstrained exercise of discretion." 136 Most sig-
nificantly for the development of checkpoints was the Prouse Court's suggestion
that "[q]uestioning of all on-coming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible
alternative."
137
The reasonableness balancing test is best explicated in Brown v. Texas 131 where
the defendant was arrested for failure to identify himself in violation of a state code
provision after being detained by officers who had no reasonable suspicion that
the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. 139 Recognizing that the defendant
had been "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes when he was detained for the
purpose of identification,140 the Court ruled that the reasonableness of the seizure
could only be determined by balancing the interests involved: "Consideration of
132. Id. at 657. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
133. In discussing the alternatives to discretionary spot checks, the Court stated: "The foremost method of en-
forcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations, it must be recalled, is acting upon observed violations." Prouse,
440 U.S. at 659. The Court pointed out that vehicles are stopped for traffic violations countless times every day,
and these drivers are subject to inspection of their licensing and registration papers. The Court further reasoned
that unlicensed drivers were presumably less safe drivers and that these propensities would be exhibited while
driving, thus making it much more likely to find unlicensed drivers among those stopped for traffic violations
than through random selection of drivers. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 663. This portion of the Prouse Court's opinion has become generally recognized in the field of
roadblock jurisprudence as "The Prouse Dictum." "The Prouse Dictum" was subsequently utilized by numerous
jurisdictions to validate sobriety checkpoints. There has been substantial debate among scholars as to whether the
Prouse majority indeed intended this brief passage to resolve the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. The
overwhelming majority of those considering the issue were of the opinion that the Prouse Court did not intend
such a result. See Have Sobriety Checkpoints Driven the Fourth Amendment Too Far?, supra note 11, at 276 ("[It
is unlikely that the Supreme Court would impliedly affirm the use of sobriety checkpoints through the dicta found
in Prouse."); Toll On the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 1002 ("The [Prouse] Court proffered this sugges-
tion merely to illustrate a less intrusive alternative, not to provide a necessarily constitutional one."); Weiner &
McCullough, supra note 11, at 252 ("This Prouse dicta has been relied on by a number of state courts in deter-
mining the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. We believe that Prouse cannot be interpreted in this manner.
The checklane issue is important enough that the . . .Supreme Court would not have resolved it so tersely.");
Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 1, at 616 ("Proponents of drunk driving roadblocks do not rely on the Prouse hold-
ing, but instead seek support from [its] dictum . . . ."); The Prouse Dicta, supra note 11, at 146 (concluding that
the Prouse Court did not intend its dicta to validate sobriety checkpoints "[blecause we believe first, that the-
...Supreme Court would not dismiss such issues summarily, and second, that the brief production of docu-
ments contemplated by the Prouse Court is less intrusive than the personal encounter of a sobriety
checkpoint ...."); Grossman, supra note 11, at 124 ("[Tlhe dictum in Prouse, when viewed in its proper con-
text, has no application to sobriety checkpoints."); Lance J. Rogers, The Drunk-Driving Roadblock: Random Sei-
zure or Minimal Intrusion ?, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 197, 199 (1985) [hereinafter Rogers] ("By suggesting . . . that
the balancing scales would be tipped in favor of the state if the stops were systematic, the Court engaged in a
curious analysis.").
136. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
137. Id.
138. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
139. Id. at49.
140. Id. at 50.
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the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the pub-
lic concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.""14 The
Brown Court then held that "[iun the absence of any basis for suspecting [the de-
fendant] of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and [the defend-
ant's] right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police
interference."142
In New Jersey v. TL.0. , " the Supreme Court utilized Camara's balancing test
to validate the search of a high school student's purse on less than probable cause.
The Court found that reasonableness was dependent "on the context within which
[the] search takes place"" and that the Camara balancing test was the appropriate
standard for this determination. In weighing the balance of student searches, the
Court felt that a school setting required modification of the level of suspicion
needed to justify a search 45 and apparently reduced the requirement of reasonable
suspicion further to one of "common sense" in school settings:
This standard [of reasonableness] will ... neither unduly burden the efforts of
school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor authorize unrestrained intru-
sions upon the privacy of school children. By focusing attention on the question of
reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school administrators the ne-
cessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to
regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense. 1
46
The Court then found, based upon this standard, that it was reasonable for an ad-
ministrator to search the student's purse for cigarettes, resulting in discovery of
marijuana, upon a report by a teacher that the student had been smoking in the
lavatory.147 In concurrence, Justice Blackmun expressed his concern that the
Court had implied that "the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception"'"
and opined that "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable
cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of
interests for that of the Framers." 49 Curiously, this proposition would come to be
utilized in later cases as further justification for application of the Camara balanc-
ing test in lieu of the traditional requirements of probable cause or a warrant.'
141. Id. at 50-51.
142. Id. at 52.
143. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
144. Id. at 337.
145. Id. at 340.
146. Id. at 342-43.
147. Id. at 343.
148. Id. at 352.
149. Id. at 351.
150. See infra notes 152, 159, & 163 and accompanying text.
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In Griffin v. Wisconsin,"'1 the Court found Justice Blackmun's proposition in
TL. 0. " appropriate to determine the constitutionality of a search of a probation-
er's home for weapons."' a The Griffin Court held that "[a] state's operation of a
probation system . . . presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause require-
ments"154 and, accordingly, held that the state regulation permitting such searches
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
155
The Supreme Court decided the most recent administrative search cases on the
same day: Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Association"' and National Trea-
sury Employees Union v. Von Raab. 157 Skinner considered the constitutionality of
regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration mandating that
employees who are involved in certain accidents or who violate certain safety rules
submit to blood and urine tests.158 Continuing to recognize Justice Blackmun's
"special needs" concurrence in TL.0. ,"59 the Skinner Court held that it was rea-
sonable to conduct these toxicological tests given the limited discretion exercised
by the employer under the regulations, the compelling safety interests served by
the tests, and the "diminished expectation of privacy that attaches to information
pertaining to the fitness of covered employees."160
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 6' the Supreme Court again
utilized the administrative search concept and its balancing analysis in considering
the constitutionality of the United States Customs Service's program requiring
employees to submit to a urinalysis test before transfer or promotion to certain po-
sitions. 162 The Von Raab Court found that the "special needs" of the Service in pre-
venting promotion of drug users to certain positions justified departure from the
traditional requirements of a warrant or probable cause in determining the consti-
tutionality of these tests.6' Thus, utilizing the balancing analysis established in
Camara, the Von Raab Court held that the compelling governmental interest in as-
suring that front-line interdiction personnel were not involved in drugs164 out-
weighed the privacy interests of the concerned employees who, unlike most
151. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
152. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
153. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870.
154. Id. at 873-74.
155. Id. at 880.
156. - U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
157. ___U.S.-, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
158. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, -U.S.-, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1407 (1989).
159. Id. at 1414. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 1422.
161. ___U.S.-, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
162. Id. at 1387.
163. Id. at 1390-91.
164. Id. at 1393.
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citizens and government employees, should expect a "diminished expectation of
privacy" 65 when involved in drug interdiction.166
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. The Majority and Concurring Opinions
The most recent cause for application of the reasonableness balancing test es-
tablished in Camara was found by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz167 in considering the constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoints. In reversing the findings of both lower courts, the Sitz Court relied
on Camara's reasonableness balancing test as explained in Brown v. Texas161 in de-
ciding that seizures at sobriety checkpoints were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, while explicitly avoiding the issue of the constitutionality of actions
following the initial detention. 
169
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, first noted that both the trial
and appellate courts properly employed the balancing test found in Brown in their
respective analyses, but also added that United States v. Martinez-Fuerte70 was
among the "relevant authorities"'71 to be considered in resolving this issue. The
Court summarily dismissed the Plaintiffs'/Respondents' contention that, in accord
with the Court's earlier decision in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,172 "there must be a showing of some special governmental need 'beyond the
normal need' for criminal law enforcement before a balancing analysis is appropri-
ate, and that petitioners [-Michigan State Police Department and its Director-]
have demonstrated no such need;"173 the Sitz Court pointed out that Martinez-
Fuerte was cited with approval in Von Raab and, thus, "it is perfectly plain from a
reading of Von Raab . . . that it was in no way designed to repudiate our prior
cases dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways." 74
165. Id. at 1394.
166. The cases discussed supra notes 94-166 should not be considered exhaustive of cases evidencing the Su-
preme Court's willingness to adopt a reasonableness balancing standard in lieu of the traditional requirements of
probable cause or a warrant, but as merely providing a skeletal background of the development, acceptance, and
enlargement of the reasonableness balancing test through use of many of the more significant decisions since its
inception in Carmar.
For example, in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Supreme Court held that government employers
may conduct warrantless work-related searches of employees' desks and offices despite a lack of probable cause.
Similarly, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld body cavity searches of prison
inmates based upon this same line of reasoning. Thus, it is obvious that the administrative search concept and its
attendant reasonableness balancing test have been employed in a myriad of contexts to justify both searches and
seizures without the traditional requisites of probable cause or a warrant.
167. -U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 4781 (1990).
168. 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
169. "It is important to recognize what our inquiry is not about. No allegations are before us of unreasonable
treatment of any person after an actual detention at a particular checkpoint." Michigan Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, - U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990).
170. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra notes 111-29 and accompanying text.
171. Sitz, IlOS. Ct. at 2485.
172. -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.




Having thus ordained the appropriate framework for the Court's analysis, Chief
Justice Rehnquist commenced the application of the Brown balancing analysis to
the relevant facts.
Stage one of this analysis "involves a weighing of the gravity of the public con-
cerns served by the seizure." '175 In assessing the gravity of drunken-driving, the
Sitz Court singly noted that "[m]edia reports of alcohol-related death and mutila-
tion on the Nation's roads are legion. The anecdotal is confirmed by the statisti-
cal."176
Stage two of the Brown balancing test requires consideration of "the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest."'17 The Court first opined that the
Michigan Court of Appeals misconstrued this balancing factor in that court's de-
termination -"based on extensive testimony in the trial record"178 - that the
checkpoint was not "effective" and that this ineffectiveness "materially discounted
[the State Police Department's] strong interest in implementing the program.
'179
Finding that neither Martinez-Fuerte nor Delaware v. Prouse18 ° "supports the
searching examination of 'effectiveness' undertaken by the Michigan Court,"181 the
majority explained the appropriate construction of this factor of the Brown analy-
sis:
The actual language from Brown v. Texas . . . describes the balancing factor as "the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest." This passage from Brown
was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the de-
cision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should
be employed to deal with a serious public danger. Experts in police science might
disagree over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers is prefera-
ble as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among
such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a
unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including
a finite number of police officers.182
The Sitz Court then juxtaposed the empirical data gleaned from the single Michi-
gan checkpoint183 -reflecting a 1.5 percentage arrest rate for alcohol impair-
ment184 - against the .5 percentage of illegal aliens detected to vehicles stopped at
175. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
176. Sitz, I10 S. Ct. at 2485.
177. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
178. Sitz, I10S. Ct. at 2487.
179. Id.
180. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. As stated in the Sitz opinion, the
Michigan Court of Appeals relied primarily upon Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse in its "effectiveness" review. Sitz,
110 S. Ct. at 2487. See Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
181. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -_U.S. 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990).
182. Id.
183. Id. This empirical data indicated that of 126 vehicles entering the checkpoint, two drivers were arrested
for drunken driving.
184. Id. See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
1991]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoint which that Court deemed "effective,"18 and rea-
soned that "[w]e see no justification for a different conclusion here.""18
Stage three of the Brown balancing analysis requires consideration of "the se-
verity of the interference with individual liberty." '187 The severity of this interfer-
ence encompasses both the "objective" and "subjective" intrusion which the
individual motorist might reasonably experience.188 Affirming both lower courts'
conclusions that the "objective" intrusion 189 on the motorist at the sobriety check-
point was "minimal," 90 the Court analogized the sobriety checkpoint seizure to
the seizures considered in Martinez-Fuerte. 19' The Court found that there was
"virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists
from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two types of check-
points, which to the average motorist would seem identical save for the nature of
the questions the checkpoint officers might ask." 92
The Sitz Court, however, again found that the appellate court misconstrued the
Supreme Court's prior decisions in finding the subjective intrusion on motorists at
the sobriety checkpoint to be "substantial." 193 In explaining the lower courts' mis-
interpretation of "subjective intrusion,"194 the Court noted that "[t]he 'fear and sur-
prise' to be considered [in reviewing the subjective intrusiveness of a checkpoint
seizure] are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of
being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather the fear and surprise engendered
in law abiding motorists by the nature of the stop." '"9 The Sitz Court held that this
distinction was made clear in Martinez-Fuerte's consideration of the different level
of intrusiveness attendant with checkpoint seizures as compared to the intrusive-
ness accompanying roving patrol seizures. 19' In finding the subjective intrusive-
185. Id. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
186. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2488.
187. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
188. The requirement of an assessment of both the "objective" and "subjective" intrusion on the individual is
found neither in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), which established the reasonableness balanc-
ing test, nor in Brown's explication of Camara upon which the Sitz Court relies. The first evidence of any signifi-
cant distinction between the "objective" and "subjective" intrusion on the individual is found in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976), where the Court apparently imposed the "subjective" intrusion in-
quiry for consideration in determining the severity of the intrusion resulting from a permanent checkpoint stop in
contrast and in addition to the mere "objective" intrusion emanating from roving patrol stops which the Court had
previously considered in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
189. The factors considered by the Court in its determination of the level of objective intrusiveness included the
"duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at
2486. See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
190. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486.
191. Id. See supra notes 111-29 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. Id. See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 184-85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
194. The subjective intrusiveness of a checkpoint seizure is deemed to involve consideration of the checkpoint's
"potential to generate fear and surprise," Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485; see Sitz v.
Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d at 184, and "the degree of discretion left to individual officers." Sitz v.
Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d at 184; see Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -U.S.
110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990).
195. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486.
196. Id. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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ness of the sobriety checkpoint "indistinguishable from the checkpoint
stops . . . upheld in Martinez-Fuerte,"1 97 the Sitz Court found significant that the
location of the sobriety checkpoint was selected pursuant to certain guidelines and
uniformed officers stopped each vehicle.198
Having thus applied the three factors of the Camara reasonableness test as ex-
plicated in Brown to the challenged sobriety checkpoint, the Sitz majority con-
cluded that "the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the
extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the
degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in
favor of the state program" '199 and, thus, satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Concur-
ring only in the judgment of the Sitz majority, Justice Blackmun noted the apparent
"little genuine public concern"200 over drunken driving in the previous twenty
years20 ' and stated, "I am pleased . . . that the Court is now stressing this tragic
aspect of American life. 202
B. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in dissent in
Parts I and II of Justice Stevens' opinion, prefaced his dissent with criticism of the
majority's findings concerning both the intrusiveness of the sobriety checkpoint -
"[s]urprise is crucial to its method"21 3-and the effectiveness of the sobriety
checkpoint -"the net effect of sobriety checkpoints on traffic safety is infinitesi-
mal and possibly negative."204 Justice Stevens noted that the trial court had given
substantial weight to Maryland's experience with sobriety checkpoints 25 and,
upon review of this evidence,20 6 concluded that any increase in arrest rate for
drunken driving provided by sobriety checkpoints, if any, would be "insignificant"
compared to the arrest rate resulting from conventional law enforcement mea-
197. Id. at 2487.
198. Id. The significance which the Court accorded the location of the checkpoint and that each vehicle was
stopped by a uniformed officer emanated from the following finding in United States v. Ortiz, which the Sitz
Court approvingly quoted and cited: "At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being
stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed
by the intrusion." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975) (cited in Michigan Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, -U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2486-87 (1990)).
199. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2488.
200. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201. Justice Blackmun reflected that in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,657 (1971), "I noted that the 'slaugh-
ter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars,' and that I detected 'little genuine public
concern about what takes place in our very midst and on our daily travel routes.' "Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2488 (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2490 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. The Michigan sobriety checkpoint program was patterned on Maryland's sobriety checkpoint program.
Id. at 2491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Results of Maryland's sobriety checkpoint program conducted over a period of several years reflected that
143 of 41,000 motorists (0.3 %) being subjected to a total of 125 checkpoints operated in the state were arrested.
Id. at 2491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sures;. °7 additionally, the impact of sobriety checkpoints in reducing highway fa-
talities "is even less substantial than the minimal impact on arrest rates."208
Part I of Justice Stevens' dissent focuses on the distinctions between "mobile" or
"temporary" sobriety checkpoints and the "permanent" checkpoints which the Su-
preme Court validated in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 20 First noting "the crit-
ical difference between a seizure that is preceded by fair notice and one that is
effected by surprise,"21 the dissent found significant that a permanent checkpoint
provided sufficient advance notice to the motorist who, thus, might completely
avoid the resulting search or at least have an opportunity to limit the attendant in-
trusion.211 In contrast, the dissent reiterated its concern that a temporary check-
point's effectiveness is dependent upon the element of surprise, and this factor
would both startle and distress an innocent motorist who might correctly infer
"that the police have made a discretionary decision to focus their law enforcement
efforts upon her and others who pass the chosen point."212
A second distinction between permanent checkpoints and temporary check-
points considered significant by the dissent was the obvious "permanence" of the
permanent checkpoints as compared to the "mobile" nature of temporary check-
points. "With respect to [permanent checkpoints], there is no room for discretion
in either the timing or the location of the stop - it is a permanent part of the land-
scape."213 In contrast, the dissent found that, though temporary sobriety check-
points are employed most frequently at night, "the police have extremely broad
discretion in determining the exact timing and placement of [a temporary] road-
block."214
The dissent next considered the difference in an officer's discretion at a perma-
nent immigration checkpoint and a temporary sobriety checkpoint following the
initial seizure.21 The dissent found that routine document checks at an immigra-
207. "[E]ven if the 143 checkpoint arrests were assumed to involve a net increase in the number of drunk driv-
ing arrests per year, the figure would still be insignificant compared to the 71,000 such arrests made by Michigan
State Police without checkpoints in 1984 alone." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Justice Stevens noted the finding of the Michigan Court of Appeals regarding Maryland's experience with
a similar sobriety checkpoint program:
"Maryland had conducted a study comparing traffic statistics between a county using checkpoints and a
control county. The results of the study showed that alcohol-related accidents in the checkpoint county
decreased by ten percent, whereas the control county saw an eleven percent decrease; and while fatal ac-
cidents in the control county fell from sixteen to three, fatal accidents in the checkpoint county actually
doubled from the prior year."
Id. at 2491-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Sitz v. Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988)).
209. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra notes 111-29 and accompanying text.





215. Though Justice Stevens' dissent briefly considered the extent of official discretion following the initial sei-




tion checkpoint were much more easily standardized than a search to detect signs
of intoxication undertaken by an officer with "virtually unlimited discretion." '216
The final distinction between the permanent immigration checkpoints of Mar-
tinez-Fuerte and the temporary sobriety checkpoints deemed important by the dis-
sent was that many of the seizures at permanent checkpoints occurred during
daylight while sobriety checkpoints were predominantly operated at night. The
dissent noted this similarity of sobriety checkpoints to the random stops consid-
ered in United States v. Ortiz,21 7 and concluded that "[a] seizure followed by inter-
rogation and even a cursory search at night is surely more offensive than a daytime
stop that is almost as routine as going through a toll gate.
21 8
Part II of Justice Stevens' dissent centers on the majority's "misapplication" of
the reasonableness balancing test found in Brown v. Texas. 219 Consideration is first
given to the "gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure "'22 whereupon
the dissent fails to find any distinction between the gravity of concern due drunken
driving and the gravity accorded a similar problem of unsafe motorists found in
Delaware v. Prouse221 and the gravity of the illegal drug problem found in Brown v.
Texas. 222 Yet in both of these decisions, the dissent points out, the gravity of the
public concern was not deemed to outweigh the other two relevant factors223 of the
Brown balancing test. Thus, the dissent reasoned, the constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoints must be found in consideration of the remaining two factors of the
Brown balancing test.224
In consideration of "the severity of the interference with individual liberty,"22
the dissent reasserted its earlier position that sobriety checkpoints, especially
when operated at night, are accompanied by more individual intrusiveness than
permanent checkpoints and added that the "unannounced investigatory seizures
are ...the hallmark of regimes far different from ours."226 The dissent did, how-
ever, admit that this difference of opinion may be predicated merely upon a dis-
agreement between the majority and dissent concerning the importance of
individual liberty.227 The dissent, however, found the majority's evaluation of
Brown's final factor -"the degree to which the seizure advances the public inter-
est"228  as "wholly indefensible."
229
216. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. 422 U.S. 891 (1975). See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
218. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
220. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
221. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
222. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
223. See supra note 141 and accompanying text for discussion of the three factors utilized by the Supreme Court
when employing the Brown balancing test.
224. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51; see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
226. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
229. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The dissent, in its critical analysis of the majority's evaluation of this final fac-
tor, considered the "effectiveness" evidence adduced at the trial court and deter-
mined:
The evidence in this case indicates that sobriety checkpoints result in the arrest of a
fraction of one percent of the drivers who are stopped, but there is absolutely no evi-
dence that this figure represents an increase over the number of arrests that would
have been made by using the same law enforcement resources in conventional pa-
trols. Thus, although the gross number of arrests is more than zero, there is a com-
plete failure of proof on the questions whether the wholesale seizures have produced
any net advance in the public interest in arresting intoxicated drivers.23
In support of this proposition, the dissent noted that neither the Michigan State Po-
lice nor the Maryland police officer who testified relied upon the number of ar-
rests made at the sobriety checkpoints as justification for the checkpoint's use.231
Rather, both asserted the position that the sobriety checkpoints served as a deter-
rent to drunken driving which, as a result, reduced the accident rate.232 The dissent
countered this position as justification for the sobriety checkpoints by stating that
the deterrent value could only be ascertained by measuring the number of drunken
driving crimes that were avoided as a result of the sobriety checkpoints; this, the
dissent noted, was not addressed in the majority opinion.23 3
Additionally, the dissent noted the difference in success of detecting illegal ali-
ens at the Martinez-Fuerte permanent immigration checkpoint234 as compared to
the arrest rate at sobriety checkpoints. The dissent also pointed out that drunken
drivers may be more easily detected without sobriety checkpoints than illegal ali-
ens could be detected without permanent immigration checkpoints. 235
Part III of the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens2 36 encompasses "[lt]he most
disturbing aspect of the Court's decision. '"237 Justice Stevens opined that the ma-
jority opinion failed to give any weight to the individual's "freedom from suspi-
cionless unannounced investigatory seizures"238 while placing great emphasis on
the needs of law enforcement "by looking only at gross receipts instead of net ben-
efits."239 Justice Stevens admitted, however, that his opposition does not extend to
230. Id. (footnotes omitted).
231. Id. at 2496.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. The dissent noted that Justice Powell's opinion in Martinez-Fuerte not only relied upon the 17,000 arrests
made at the checkpoint in 1973, but was also accompanied by an explanation as to the net benefit to law enforce-
ment resulting from these arrests. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2496 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
235. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2497 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
236. Justices Brennan and Marshall did not join in Part III of Justice Stevens' dissent.
237. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Id.
239. Id. This proposition alludes to an earlier finding of Justice Stevens that "[tihe Court's analysis of this issue




all types of investigatory procedures24 and suggested that requiring motorists to
submit to a breathalyzer test at a permanent checkpoint might better serve the pur-
pose of detecting drunken drivers while avoiding the constitutional pitfalls attend-
ant with "[r]andom, suspicionless seizures designed to search for evidence of
firearms, drugs, or intoxication." '241 Justice Stevens finally noted that sobriety
checkpoints were utilized as publicity stunts242 and warned that "symbolic state
action [is] an insufficient justification for an otherwise unreasonable program of
random seizures."243
Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in dissent against the majority's justifi-
cation for application of the Brown reasonableness balancing test in the majority's
consideration of the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. The dissent asserts
that
[t]he majority opinion creates the impression that the Court generally engages in a
balancing test in order to determine the constitutionality of all seizures, or at least
those 'dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways' . . . [because,]
[i]n most cases, the police must possess probable cause for a seizure to be judged
reasonable.'"
The dissent notes that "[oinly when a seizure is 'substantially less intrusive' than a
typical arrest is the general rule replaced by a balancing test"24 and then agrees
with the majority that the initial seizure at a sobriety checkpoint satisfies this "sub-
stantially less intrusive" requirement. The dissent, however, expresses concern
that nowhere in the majority opinion may be found that "the reason for employing
the balancing test is that the seizure is minimally intrusive."246 Rather, the major-
ity finds that the seizure is "slight" and then makes the unexplained finding that the
balance favors the governmental interest.247 The dissent then states that "[the
Court has] generally required the Government to prove that it had reasonable sus-
picion for a minimally intrusive seizure to be considered reasonable
[and] ...[b]y holding that no level of suspicion is necessary before the police
may stop a car for the purpose of preventing drunken driving, the Court poten-
tially subjects the general public to arbitrary or harassing conduct by the po-
lice."24
240. An example of an investigatory procedure acceptable to Justice Stevens involved the practice of requiring
airline passengers and visitors of public buildings to pass through metal detectors. Id. at 2497-98.
241.Id. at 2498.
242. Justice Stevens quoted Lieutenant Cotton of the Maryland State Police who had testified at the trial:
'[Tihe media coverage . ..has been absolutely overwhelming . . . .Quite frankly we got benefits just from the
controversy of the sobriety checkpoints.' "Id. (footnotes omitted).
243. Id. at 2499.
244. Id. at 2488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485) (citing Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979)).
245. Id. at 2489 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979)).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. (citations omitted).
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The dissent then presumes that the majority's decision upholding suspicionless
seizures at sobriety checkpoints is predicated upon reliance on Martinez-Fuerte. 249
This reliance by the majority on Martinez-Fuerte, however, is criticized for the
same reasons forwarded in Justice Stevens' dissent,250 as well as upon the premise
that Martinez-Fuerte excused reasonable suspicion as a predicate to seizure be-
cause " 'reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic
tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would
enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.' 251 In contrast, how-
ever, the dissent points out that there has been no evidence that the same problem
exists in detecting drunken drivers.25 2 The dissent concluded that "[w]ithout proof
that the police cannot develop individualized suspicion that a person is driving
while impaired by alcohol, . . . the constitutional balance must be struck in favor
of protecting the public against even the 'minimally intrusive' seizures involved in
[sobriety checkpoints] ."253
V. ANALYSIS
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz," 4 the United States Supreme
Court validated the use of sobriety checkpoints in detecting drunken drivers de-
spite the absence of a judicially-issued warrant, probable cause, or even reason-
able suspicion. The Sitz Court's holding that sobriety checkpoints did not violate
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment is based upon an application of the rea-
sonableness balancing test as represented in Brown v. Texas2. and upon the Court's
previous decision in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,2"' where the use of perma-
nent checkpoints for detecting illegal aliens was held constitutional.2 7 Neither of
these decisions, however, nor the rationale underlying each decision, provide a
sound basis for the Sitz Court's determination that sobriety checkpoints satisfy the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause or a warrant.
Much to the contrary, the Sitz Court's validation of sobriety checkpoints may well
foreshadow the Court's willingness to decide Fourth Amendment issues on an ad
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
251. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976)).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 2490.
254. - U.S. - , I10S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
255. 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). See supra note 141 and accompanying text. See Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, -U.S. 110 S. Ct. 2481,2495 (1990). See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967) (establishing the reasonableness balancing test).
256. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra notes 111-29 and accompanying text. See Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, _U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2481,2485 (1990).




hoc public policy basis2 8 without just consideration being afforded Fourth
Amendment requirements. An analysis of the Fourth Amendment's applicability
to sobriety checkpoints will demonstrate the errors in the Sitz Court's constitu-
tional analysis of sobriety checkpoints" 9 and clearly reveal the resulting potential
for further infringement upon individual liberties. Factors relevant to this analysis
include: (1) the inapplicability of the reasonableness balancing test and its concur-
rent reduction of the standard for probable cause to sobriety checkpoints, (2) the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to sobriety check-
points, and (3) the elimination of an "effectiveness" review from the reasonable-
ness balancing test.
258. As corroborating evidence of the Court's movement in this direction, consider Justice Scalia's scathing
words of dissent in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, ..- U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989):
I do not believe for a minute that the driving force behind these drug-testing rules was any of the feeble
justifications put forward by counsel here and accepted by the Court. The only plausible explanation, in
my view, is what the Commissioner himself offered in the concluding sentence of his memorandum to
Customs Service employees announcing the program:
"Implementation of the drug screening program would set an important example in our country's struggle
with the most serious threat to our national health and security." Or as respondent's brief to this Court
asserted: "if a law enforcement agency and its employees do not take the law seriously, neither will the
public on which the agency's effectiveness depends." What better way to show that the Government is
serious about its "war on drugs" than to subject its employees on the front line of that war to this invasion
of their privacy and affront to their dignity? To be sure, there is only a slight chance that [employee drug
testing] will prevent some serious public harm resulting from Service employee drug use, but it... -
most important of all - will demonstrate the determination of the Government to eliminate this scourge of
our society! I think it obvious that this justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of individual
liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause-
. . . cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search.
Von Raab, __ U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1401 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See
also id. at 1398 ("While there are some absolutes in Fourth Amendment law, as soon as those have been left be-
hind and the question comes down to whether a particular search has been 'reasonable,' the answer depends
largely upon the social necessity that prompts the search.").
259. There is yet another aspect of the Sitz Court's ruling worthy of critical analysis. One should consider the
implication of the Court's explicit refusal to address the actions of law enforcement officials following the initial
detention at a sobriety checkpoint. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, ..- U.S. - , 110 S. Ct.
2481, 2485 (1990). Though the Court declined to address this issue because there were "[nlo allegations-
. . . before [the Court] of unreasonable treatment of any person after an actual detention at a particular check-
point," id., it is difficult to fathom how the Court may proceed to validate the use of sobriety checkpoints without
careful consideration of this critical aspect of the sobriety checkpoints' modus operandi. Indeed, an essential fac-
tor for consideration in the reasonableness balancing analysis, purportedly utilized by the Court in its decision, is
the "effectiveness" of the challenged activity in achieving its desired goal(s). See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
50-51 (1979). See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (establishing the reasonable-
ness balancing test and, in its analysis, finding periodic inspections to be "the only effective way to seek universal
compliance."). There is obviously a direct correlation between the methods employed by law enforcement offi-
cers for detecting drunken drivers following the initial detention and the overall "effectiveness" of the sobriety
checkpoints in detecting drunken drivers. If this correlation were not self-evident, the Court's opinion would lead
one to believe that the initial detention, without more, is the "effective" means by which drunken drivers are de-
tected. The permeability of this reasoning is glaring. This note proposes that the Sitz Court did not, however,
intend to found its opinion on such reasoning but, rather, merely eliminated the "effectiveness" review as a requi-
site consideration in the reasonableness balancing analysis. See infra notes 360-67 and accompanying text.
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A. Camara Not "Apt Model' 60
Though the Sitz Court relied upon the reasonableness balancing test as ex-
pressed in Brown261 in upholding the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints, this
note reflects that the concept of applying a test of reasonableness in administrative
search contexts in lieu of requiring a warrant or probable cause originated in Cam-
ara v. Municipal Court,262 where the Camara Court reduced the traditional stand-
ard of probable cause to a test of "reasonableness" in administrative search
contexts.263 The Sitz Court's reliance upon the reasonableness balancing test must
thus be viewed in light of the considerations, purposes, and interests sought to be
served by formulation of the reasonableness test in Camara.
The Camara Court recognized that "there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails,"264 and forwarded three factors which the Court deemed
as "persuasive" evidence of "the reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspec-
tions:"26 (1) "such programs have a long history of judicial and public accept-
ance, '266 (2) "the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be
prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would
achieve acceptable results,"267 and (3) "because the inspections are neither per-
sonal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a rel-
atively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. '26 Consideration of these
"persuasive" factors, however, will reveal that these factors are not similarly
present in Sitz, thus arousing doubt as to the precedential appropriateness of the
Sitz Court's reduction of the traditional standard of probable cause to a standard of
"reasonableness" in consideration of the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints.
1. History of Judicial and Public Acceptance
The Camara Court found that code-related housing inspections "have a long
history of judicial and public acceptance.'269 Sobriety checkpoints, however, have
not enjoyed this same acceptance. Prior to Sitz, courts evidenced obvious dis-
260. This language derives from the majority's opinion in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
564-65 (1976), where the Court held that Camara was not an "apt model" for requiring a warrant in the case of a
permanent checkpoint utilized for detecting illegal aliens. Though this particular reasoning of the Martinez-
Fuerte Court will be considered in greater detail infra, the same general reasoning-i.e., the inapplicability of
Camara- is similarly pertinent in the Sitz Court's unwarranted utilization of the reasonableness balancing test in
its analysis. For discussion of the warrant requirement to which specific reference was made in Martinez-Fuerte,
see supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
262. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
263. See supra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
264. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).







agreement as to both the effectiveness27 and the constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoints.271 Additionally, there is little evidence to suggest that there has been
general public approval of the use of sobriety checkpoints.272 Sobriety check-
points, therefore, are not worthy of the same deference afforded code-related
housing inspections by Camara as justification for reducing the traditional stand-
ard of probable cause.
2. The Public Interest and Acceptable Results
Included among the factors deemed persuasive by the Camara Court in justify-
ing a reduction of the traditional standard of probable cause to one of reasonable-
ness was the Court's finding that "the public interest demands that all dangerous
conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing
technique would achieve acceptable results.'273 The considerations inherent in this
factor are more readily amenable to contemporary Fourth Amendment analysis
when viewed as two distinct considerations: (1) the gravity of the public interest in
preventing or abating the dangerous condition, and (2) the effectiveness of the
method(s) employed in achieving this result when considered in light of available
alternatives. 274
The gravity of the public interest in preventing or abating drunken driving is
virtually unquestionable.27 Thus, the public interest may appropriately be
270. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Cf Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) ("It
would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the
chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indig-
nity of such a search.").
272. See 1,300 Oppose Sobriety Stops, The Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1983, at B3, col. 6 ("More than 1,300
Harford County residents have signed a petition opposing the sobriety checkpoints set up recently by Maryland
state police .... "); Court Ruling to Give More Drivers Experience with Sobriety Checks, N.Y. Times, June 17,
1990, at 1, col. 4 ("In a tavern a few miles from the roadblock here, patrons were unanimous in their opposition to
such checks."). But see Police Plan Attack on Drunk Drivers, The Washington Post, Dec. 13, 1983, at A 1, col. 2
("According to Tom Crosby, spokesman for the American Automobile Association's Potomac division, 78.2 per-
cent of AAA's area members said in a recent survey that they approved of the roadblocks."); Sobriety Checkpoint
Snares More Controversy than Suspects, The Washington Post, Jan. 2, 1985, at D 1, col. 4 and D8, col. 2 ("Most
motorists didn't mind being stopped . . . . In spite of a delay of about five minutes, the overwhelming response
from drivers and passengers was positive."); 800 Motorists Stopped in La Palma Drinking Crackdown, L.A.
Times, June 13, 1989, at 3, col. 2 (reporting that officers at checkpoint received "thank yous" from motorists).
The most vociferous support of sobriety checkpoints is found in national citizens' lobbies such as "Mothers
Against Drunk Driving" (MADD) and "Remove Intoxicated Drivers" (RID). See generally The Prouse Dicta, su-
pra note 11; Have Sobriety Checkpoints Driven the Fourth Amendment Too Far?, supra note 11; Designing Consti-
tutional Sobriety Roadblocks, supra note 11. The effectiveness of these groups extends from the local, grass-roots
level to the national level:
The grass-roots organizations played a significant role in [President Reagan's] decision to establish the
Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving (PCDD). Citizens for Safe Drivers (CSD), and Remove In-
toxicated Drivers (RID) had prompted local, state, and federal officials to take a hard look at the problem
and to propose some reasonable solutions.
Alcohol and Public Safety, supra note 1 at 119.
273. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
274. This restatement of the second factor found persuasive by the Comara Court in justifying the reduction of
the traditional standard of probable cause in the context of administrative searches is strikingly similar to the first
two factors found in the reasonableness balancing test of Brown. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. This
further evidences that the reasonableness balancing test utilized by the Sitz Court originated in Camara.
275. See supra note 1.
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deemed "persuasive" in consideration of whether sobriety checkpoints must sat-
isfy the traditional standard of probable cause. The gravity of the public interest
alone, however, is not sufficient to comport with the findings of the Camara
Court. This public interest must be evidenced in tandem with a showing that the
method(s) employed to achieve the desired result is effective as compared to other
available alternatives. This caveat on the second "persuasive" factor found by the
Camara Court reveals perhaps the most glaring weakness of sobriety checkpoints
and the decision in Sitz.
The initial problem concerning sobriety checkpoints in this aspect of the analy-
sis is the general "effectiveness" of sobriety checkpoints in detecting and deterring
drunken drivers. Judicial decisions reflect general disagreement concerning sobri-
SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS
ety checkpoints' effectiveness.27 This questionable "effectiveness" of sobriety
checkpoints in detecting and deterring drunken drivers is further reduced when
276. The disagreement over the "effectiveness" of sobriety checkpoints is catalogued by decisions considering
the issue. For evidence supporting the "effectiveness" of sobriety checkpoints see State v. Superior Court, 691
P.2d 1073, 1077 (1984); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1310 (Cal. 1987); People v. Bartley, 486 N.E.2d
880, 886 (ill. 1985); People v. Bartley, 482 N.E.2d 437, 440 (i1. 1985); State v. Garcia, 481 N.E.2d 148, 153-
54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903,913 (Md. 1983); State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131, 134-
35 (N.J. 1980); People v. Scott, 473 N.E.2d 1, 5-6, (N.Y. 1984); State v. Martin, 496 A.2d 442, 447 (Vt.
1985); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 273, 277 (Va. 1985).
Sobriety checkpoints have also been deemed "effective" by a limited number of scholars considering the issue.
See Clearing the Roadblocks, supra note 11, at 502 ("As part of a comprehensive program to combat drunk driv-
ing, sobriety checkpoints serve to deter and detect drunk drivers. The fear of arrest often reduces the frequency
with which occasional offenders drive under the influence of alcohol."); id. at 507 ("In measuring effectiveness
• ..it is important to remember that the appropriate variable is not the number of arrests made, but rather the
number of lives saved."); D WI Roadblocks, supra note 11, at 801 ("If . . . the state's goal is to deter drunk driv-
ing, most courts agree that a sobriety checkpoint is clearly an effective tool."). See generally Grossman, supra
note 11, (suggesting that the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints may be found in the checkpoints' deterrent ef-
fect).
But see Michigan Dept of State Police v. Sitz, _ U. S _ 110 S. Ct. 2481,2490 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc); State v. Henderson,
756 P.2d 1057 (1988); Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903,920 (1984) (Davidson, J., dissenting); State v. Muzik, 379
N.W.2d 599,604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 982 (N.H. 1985); Webb v. State, 695
S.W2d 676, 682 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
See also Designing Constitutional Sobriety Roadblocks, supra note 11, at 139 ("If roadblock effectiveness is
judged solely by the number of resulting arrests, such results are dismal."); Grossman, supra note 11, at 157 (ex-
isting empirical data does not support finding that sobriety checkpoints increase either detection or deterrence of
drunken drivers); id. at 160 ("[A] close analysis of the information available from government and other sources
reveals that sobriety checkpoints have not been successful in curtailing drunk driving. In fact, the alleged deter-
rent effect of sobriety checkpoints cannot be supported either theoretically or empirically."); Toll on the Fourth
Amendment, supra note 11, at 991 ("The available data indicate that DUI roadblocks are grossly ineffective at
uncovering persons who are driving under the influence."); Have Sobriety Checkpoints Driven the Fourth Amend-
ment Too Far?, supra note 11, at 279-80 ("[Clourts which have attempted to examine the effectiveness of-
...sobriety checkpoints have generally found no empirical data to support the argument that the checkpoints
are productive enough to justify the intrusion on constitutional rights. The available statistics show that arrest
rates at sobriety checkpoints are very low.") (footnotes omitted); Jacobs & Strossen, supra note I (doubting that
sobriety checkpoints are sufficiently productive in detecting and deterring drunken drivers to satisfy the state's
burden of proof in a Fourth Amendment balancing analysis). For consideration of relevant statistical evidence
compiled by several police departments utilizing sobriety checkpoints see Grossman, supra note 11, at 157
n. 190.
There are other decisions which did not consider "effectiveness" of the sobriety checkpoints relevant to their
determination. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Trumble, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985) (finding decisive whether
checkpoints were conducted in accordance with pre-determined guidelines); State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174
(1983) (sobriety checkpoints are constitutional when there are sufficient safeguards present to insure minimal
intrusion and the discretion of field officers is limited); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 449 N.E.2d 349
(1983) (considering adequacy of procedural safeguards and degree of delay and arbitrariness present in operation
of sobriety checkpoint); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976) (sobriety checkpoints found unconstitu-
tional because not sufficiently analogous to "permanent" checkpoints in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976)).
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recognition is given the proposition that the deterrent effect of sobriety check-
points is substantially crippled by the lack of effect on problem drinkers.277
The Sitz Court, nevertheless, found the challenged sobriety checkpoint "effec-
tive" in detecting drunken drivers by engaging in an analysis of the empirical data
gleaned from operation of the single challenged checkpoint.278 In its analysis, the
Sitz Court juxtaposed the findings of Delaware v. Prouse,279 where there was no
empirical evidence to support the requisite constitutional "effectiveness" of the
stops in advancing the desired state interest,2 8' against the empirical data gathered
from operation of one sobriety checkpoint. The empirical evidence gathered from
this checkpoint, apparently deemed most persuasive in the Sitz Court's review,
was that two drunken drivers of the 126 vehicles (or approximately 1.5 %) stopped
were arrested for drunken driving. This rather small percentage evidently pro-
vides substantial reason to question the "effectiveness" of the sobriety checkpoint
in advancing the "grave and legitimate" interest of the State.281 The Court noted,
however, that the requisite constitutional effectiveness was found in United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte282 where only 0.12 % of the vehicles stopped resulted in uncov-
ering illegal aliens.283 This questionable reliance by the Sitz Court upon limited
empirical evidence is, at best, unpersuasive.
Sobriety checkpoints must not only be "effective" in achieving the desired
results, however, for this "effectiveness" must also be judged in light of other avail-
able alternatives for enforcement. The Sitz Court completely disregarded this con-
sideration of Camara, however, apparently relying on a literal reading of the
277. Studies of drunken drivers indicate that problem drinkers (alcoholics) are not capable of being deterred
from drinking and driving because of their mental and physical dependence on alcohol. See Grossman, supra note
11, at 160-61. One scholar suggests that the deterrent effect of drunken driving laws is felt primarily by social
drinkers who represent only a moderate traffic risk.
The law has been a success with regard to the ordinary social drinkers. Most of these are people who also
without the strict rules of the law would have been moderate consumers and have shown some feeling of
responsibility while driving, in spite of being under the influence to some extent. Motorists driving with
very high BAC levels, and therefore representing a high risk factor in traffic, more often than not are
persons with serious alcohol problems, often aggravated by other social shortcomings. These people are
poor targets for the deterrent and moral effect of the law .... In short, it is reasonable to believe that the
law's motivating effect is strongest among those who would have represented only a moderate traffic risk
even if they had consumed alcohol in excess of the legal limit.
ANDANEAS, Drinking -And-Driving Lavs in Scandinavia, in SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 13, 21 (1984).
Cf Alcohol and Public Safety, supra note 1, at 138 ("[I]t is known that heavy or problem alcohol abusers account
for a disproportionate share of drunken drinking incidents compared to the total drinking and driving popula-
tion.").
278. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, __U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487-88 (1990).
279. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse, the Court utilized the balancing analysis in finding that discretionary
spot checks, given the alternatives, were not sufficiently effective to outweigh the attendant intrusion on motor-
ists. Id. at 658-61. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
280. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
281. Id. at 2484. See Establishing Roadblocks, supra note I at 56 ("Sufficient data are . . . available to demon-
strate the ineffectiveness of sobriety checkpoints as they have been administered to date.") (footnote omitted).
See generally 4 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRt 73-74 (2d ed. 1987).
282. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
283. Id. at 554.
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reasonableness balancing test as explicated in Brown v. Texas284 without consider-
ing the rationale underlying its origination. The absence of an equally effective al-
ternative to code enforcement was significant in the Camara Court's finding that
area inspection programs might be based on less than the traditional standard of
probable cause. 285
The significance of the Sitz Court's failure to address this consideration is am-
plified by evidence that there are, in fact, more effective alternatives to sobriety
checkpoints for detecting drunken drivers.286 As noted in Delaware v. Prouse,287
"[the] foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations ...is
284. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The reasonableness balancing test found in Brown makes no explicit reference to con-
sideration of the availability of a more effective alternative. Id. at 50-51. The second factor of the Brown test,
however, suggests recognition of this rationale underlying origination of the test in Camara -"the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest." Id. at 51 (emphasis added). Inherent in consideration of the degree of
effectiveness in advancing the public interest is certainly consideration of the availability of a more effective alter-
native and the degree to which it would advance the state interest.
285. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,535-36 (1967) ("There is unanimous agreement among those
most familiar with this field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards
required by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures.") (emphasis added).
286. See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Mich. 1988) ("[Sheriffs] testified as to
other means used in their counties to combat drunk driving and as to their respective opinions that other methods
currently in use, e.g., patrol cars, were more effective means of combating drunk driving and utilizing law en-
forcement resources than sobriety checkpoints."); People v. Bartley, 466 N.E.2d 346, 348 (I11. 1984) (finding
less intrusive means available for detecting drunken drivers through observation by trained officers and for deter-
ring drunken drivers in the enactment of stiffer penalties); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 147 (Me. 1985)
("There may be many effective ways of detecting a drunken driver without intruding on the rights of the citi-
zen."); Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903, 917-18 (Md. 1984) (Davidson, J., dissenting) (recognizing the effective-
ness of Maryland's traditional techniques for deterring and detecting drunken drivers and concluding that "not
only empirical data but also other evidence proffered by the State demonstrates that a roadblock program [is]
unnecessary because effective alternatives [are] available.").
See also Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 1, at 609 (listing traditional law enforcement techniques which are effec-
tive in enforcing drunk driving laws); Exploring the Constitutional Limits, supra note 5, at 607 (finding DWI
roadblocks unconstitutional because there are more effective alternative methods).
See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZuRE 71-73 (2d ed. 1987).
But see State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ("[Olne advantage of the roadblock
over traditional methods of DWI law enforcement is the potential deterrent effect that roadblocks might have on
those who would drink and drive.").
287. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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acting upon observed violations." '288 Indeed, the absence of a more effective alter-
native has been recognized as justification for validating other constitutionally
288. Id. at 659. See State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1137-38 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he drunk
driver tends to generate articulable suspicion by his poor driving performance."); State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d
1174, 1187 (Kan. 1983) (Prager, J., dissenting) ("Generally drunk drivers, through their behavior behind the
wheel, manifest their presence to even lay observers. They can easily be discerned by law enforcement officers
skilled in identifying the signals indicating a driver is operating the vehicle under the influences of alcohol or
drugs."); State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293, 1303 (La. 1988) ("[Rioving patrols making stops of erratic drivers are
more effective [than roadblocks] against drunken driving."). In State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d
992 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc), the court commented on the significance of the state's admission that officers pos-
sessed the ability to detect drunken drivers through observation:
In the past, the foremost method of enforcing the DWI laws has been by observing how the person drives.
The state has stipulated that "[Department of Public Safety] officials, by observing and patrolling, regu-
larly arrest drivers for DWI when there are no roadblocks. DPS officers are trained to detect drunk driv-
ers on the road on the basis of observation. An experienced DPS officer becomes highly skilled at
detecting drunk drivers by watching how a person drives. Without roadblocks, an experienced DPS offi-
cer can detect many drunk drivers."
By the foregoing quotation, we see that the state has in effect stipulated itself out of court. If there is an
adequate method of enforcing the drunk driving statute, there is no pressing need for the use of an intru-
sive roadblock device.
Ekstrom, 663 P.2d at 996.
Numerous factors which law enforcement officials rely upon in detecting drunken drivers through observations
are found in the following list of characteristics of drunken drivers compiled by the California Highway Patrol:
1. Unreasonable speed (high).
2. Driving in spurts (slow, then fast, then slow).
3. Frequent lane changing with excessive speed.
4. Improper passing with insufficient clearance; also taking too long or swerving too much in overtaking
and passing, e.g., overcontrol.
5. Overshooting or disregarding traffic control signals.
6. Approaching signals unreasonably fast or slow, and stopping or attempting to stop with uneven motion.
7. Driving at night without lights. Delay in turning lights on when starting from a parked position.
8. Failure to dim lights to oncoming traffic.
9. Driving in lower gears without apparent reason, or repeatedly clashing gears.
10. Jerky starting or stopping.
11. Driving unreasonably slow.
12. Driving too close to shoulders or curbs, or appearing to hug the edge of the road or continually strad-
dling the center line.
13. Driving with windows down in cold weather.
14. Driving or riding with head partly or completely out of the window.
H. LAWRENCE Ross, Law, Science and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11
(1973) (quoted in Toll on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 992 n.73).
See also Jeffrey Eugene Jones, Note, The Constitutionality of Sobriety Checkpoints, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1469, 1495-96 (1986) ("Because the drunk driving roadblock is not as effective in detecting and apprehending
drunk drivers as is the routine roving patrol that stops drivers based on erratic driving behavior, the state must
rely on the fact that the deterrence effect of the roadblock outweighs the intrusion of the seizure."); A Sobering
Look, supra note 11, at 602 ("Unless a DUI roadblock serves as a deterrent to drunk drivers, the states can ade-
quately enforce their drunk driving statutes by the more traditional method of observation by patrolling offi-
cers."); Exploring the Constitutional Limits, supra note 5, at 592 ("In considering the difficult question of
whether a less intrusive, but comparably effective, alternative method exists, the empirical evidence generally
suggests that the observational method is more effective in apprehending drunken drivers than are roadblocks, if
effectiveness is measured in terms of DWI arrests per officer hour.").
See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 72 (2d ed. 1987).
There is, however, at least one countervailing argument advanced to cast doubt upon the assertion that the
traditional method of observation is more effective in detecting drunken drivers:
[Elven if a patrolling officer is fortunate enough to be in the vicinity where a drunk driver is operating his
vehicle, it does not necessarily follow that the driver will at that particular time drive his car in such a
fashion as to create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. And the chances of such observation in the
first place are rather slight, given the substantial number of intoxicated drivers on the roads.
4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 72-73 (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted).
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challenged enforcement measures.28 Additionally, there is evidence suggesting
that observational methods of detecting drunken drivers are "more effective" than
sobriety checkpoints in promoting the efficient utilization of scarce police re-
sources. 290
Thus, given evidence that there are in fact more effective alternatives in detect-
ing drunken drivers and the questionable effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints,291
sobriety checkpoints cannot equate with the Camara Court's finding that "the pub-
lic interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is
doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results."292
3. Severity of Intrusion and Crime Detection
The final consideration deemed "persuasive" by the Camara Court as justifica-
tion for a reduction of the traditional standard of probable cause was the Court's
289. Examples of other enforcement measures upheld where the court recognized the absence of a more effec-
tive alternative in achieving the desired results include license-registration roadblocks and hunting and fishing
roadblocks. See People v. Andrews, 484 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Colo. 1971) (en banc) (upholding roadblocks for
checking licenses); State v. Tourtillot, 618 P.2d 423, 430 (Or. 1980) (finding that game checkpoint stops are the
most effective method of enforcing game laws).
See also Rogers, supra note 135, at 212 ("[A]irport and border checkpoints are justifiable given the complete
lack of alternatives available to cope with the problems of hijacking and illegal aliens .. . .The sobriety/license
checkpoints do not constitute the only alternative available to authorities seeking to cope with drunk drivers.").
290. See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Mich. App. 1988) (sheriffs testified that
there "were more effective means of combating drunk driving and utilizing law enforcement resources than sobri-
ety checkpoints.") (emphasis added); State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057 (Idaho 1988):
[The] Chief of Police ...stated that his general experience was that the same number of officers on pa-
trol would make more DUI arrests than the same number of officers engaged in a roadblock. [T]he road-
block commander ...acknowledged that it is more efficient to have well-trained officers on patrol for
DUI than at a roadblock. When asked if he could expect more arrests by putting the same number of offi-
cers on the street for the same amount of time, [he] replied, "absolutely."
Id. at 1060-61 (citations omitted).
See also R. George Wright, Intoxication Roadblocks, 19 IND. L. REv. 33, 43 (1986) ("While the cases do not
permit a rigorous comparison of the cost-effectiveness of roadblocks and of routine patrolling, the productivity in
terms of detection and apprehension per police officer-hour of roadblocks may well not exceed that of conscien-
tious routine patrolling, other things being equal.").
Cf Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2490 n. 1 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (noting that the standard detail for operation of a sobriety checkpoint is composed of at least eight
officers and may have as many as twelve present); Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (recognizing the absence of evidence as to how many DUI arrests might be made by the same number of
officers utilized at a sobriety checkpoint); State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057 (Idaho 1988) (challenged check-
point required 21 officers for its operation). The challenged checkpoint in State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1984), evidences the extent to which law enforcement resources may be utilized in the operation of a
carefully planned checkpoint:
The checkpoints were manned by teams of ten officers each, with supervisory personnel also present at
[each of the three locations]. Additionally, the agencies had on the sites mobile vans for booking and jal-
ing offenders, blood testing equipment, breatholizer equipment, trained phlebotomists to administer
blood tests, and moble jail units to transport offenders.
Id. at 563.
291. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text; Establishing Roadblocks, supra note 1:
The ultimate question that the [Sitz] Court answered is that the arrest of approximately one percent of the
motorists passing through a roadblock is sufficient to provide the law-enforcement community with the
ability to establish temporary, unannounced sobriety checkpoints and intrude on more [sic] approxi-
mately 99 percent of the motoring public. Certainly, the Court could not suggest that this approach is the
most effective and efficient method of diminishing the problem of drunk driving.
Id. at58.
292. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
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finding that "the inspections [were] neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime, [and] involve[d] a relatively limited invasion of
the urban citizen's privacy.'293 For purposes of analysis, this factor is also separa-
ble into two distinct considerations: (1) the challenged enforcement activity is not
aimed at the discovery of crime, and (2) the severity of the enforcement activity's
intrusion on individual liberties.
With detection of drunken drivers being one of the avowed purposes of sobriety
checkpoints, there can be little doubt that sobriety checkpoints are aimed at the
discovery of crime.294 Indeed, sobriety checkpoints are analogous to random area
searches,29 which Justice Powell has characterized as "no more than 'fishing ex-
peditions' for evidence to support prosecutions."296 Therefore, unless law enforce-
ment officials are prepared to suggest that sobriety checkpoints are utilized solely
for the checkpoints' unsubstantiated deterrent effect, an assertion that sobriety
checkpoints are not aimed at the discovery of crime can hardly be accorded cre-
dence.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983) ("The primary purpose in
establishing the roadblock was to enforce the state's drunk driving laws by discovering drunk drivers . . .");
Colorado v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 496 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (Quinn, J., dissenting) ("The officers were directed
to look for evidence of alcohol impairment, and only if no such evidence was found was the motorist to be directed
to proceed . . . ."); State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1061 (Idaho 1988) ("A roadblock is not an administra-
tive search merely designed to raise an awareness of the DUI problem. It is carried out by police-not OSHA or
Health and Welfare officials-and if convictions are sustained, it has penal consequences."); State v. Smith, 674
P.2d 562,563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) ("[T]he primary purpose of the checkpoints was to seek out DUI offend-
ers."); King v. Texas, 816 S.W.2d 447, 450-51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (roadblock set up as subterfuge for catching
drunk drivers); The Prouse Dicta, supra note II at 136 ("A sobriety checkpoint [is] . . . aimed at the detection of
crime."); id. at 151 ("It is clear that if driving under the influence of alcohol is considered a crime by our society,
sobriety checkpoints are specifically designed to detect that crime."). See also id. at 145 ("The mere 'questioning'
of a suspected drunk driver is of a little value if the officer in the field is not permitted to gather the evidence
necessary to obtain a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.").
The apparent unwillingness of law enforcement authorities to provide the public with advance notification of
the implementation of a sobriety checkpoint, and the detrimental effect which this advance notification would
have on the purported effectiveness of the checkpoint, see supra notes 203, 209-12 and accompanying text, and
infra notes 306-12 and accompanying text, belies any assertion that the checkpoints are operated for their deter-
rent value.
Certainly it would be feasible, even beneficial, for law enforcement agencies to undertake to publicize in
advance their intention to utilize sobriety checkpoints. This is because "the efficacy of a deterrent road-
block is heightened by advance publicity in the media . . . . Such publicity would warn those using the
highways that they might expect to find roadblocks designed to check for sobriety; the warning may well
decrease the chance of apprehending 'ordinary' criminals, but should certainly have a considerable deter-
ring effect by either dissuading people from taking 'one more for the road,' persuading them to drink at
home, or inducing them to take taxicabs." Any one of these goals, if achieved, would have the salutary
effect of interfering with the lethal combination of alcohol and gasoline.
4 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 81-82 (2d ed. 1987) (footnote ommitted) (quoting State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Jus-
tice Court, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983) (Feldman, J., concurring)) (footnote omitted).
For additional decisions recognizing the utility of advance publicity see 4 LAFLAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 82
n. 136 (2d ed. 1987).
295. The analogy of sobriety checkpoints to random area searches is found in the fact that sobriety checkpoints
are temporary - i.e., not permanently located in a specified area- and also that the checkpoints subject all mo-
torists passing through the checkpoints to a limited investigation.
296. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,278 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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The Camara Court's final consideration also requires a determination of the se-
verity of the sobriety checkpoints' intrusion297 on individual liberties. In finding
that the intrusion on motorists effectuated by sobriety checkpoints is "slight, 298
the Sitz Court relied upon United States v. Martinez-Fuerte299 in determining that
the objective intrusion on motorists is "minimal""' and that the subjective intru-
sion on motorists was not to such a degree as to "generate fear and surprise" 30 1 in
law-abiding motorists. Though most decisions considering the objective intrusive-
ness of checkpoints evidence general agreement with the Sitz Court's opinion that
297. In determining the severity of intrusion in contemporary Fourth Amendment analysis, courts have distin-
guished the nature of the intrusion between the "objective" nature of the intrusion and the "subjective" nature of
the intrusion. "Objective" intrusiveness for purposes of checkpoint stop analysis is "measured by the duration of
the seizure and the intensity of the investigation." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, l-U.S.__ ,
110 S. Ct. 2481, 2486 (1990). The "subjective" intrusiveness of checkpoint stops has been defined as "the gener-
ating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
558 (1976).
298. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2481,2486 (1990).
299. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
300. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2486. The Sitz Court found that there was "virtually no difference" between the objec-
tive nature of the intrusion of sobriety checkpoints and the intrusion present at the checkpoints in Martinez-
Fuerte. The only difference between the two checkpoints recognized by the Sitz Court was that there may be
different types of questions asked by the officers at each. Id.
301. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals adopted the trial court's finding that the subjective intrusiveness of the
challenged sobriety checkpoint was "substantial," Sitz v. Department of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 184
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988), because "the evidence showed [an] absence of any provision to alert the public to the
option of turning around to avoid a checkpoint and the further absence of a provision ensuring that the check-
points would be located where motorists could safely and legally make U-turns or turn-offs." Department of State
Police, 429 N.W.2d at 185. The Sitz Court, however, opined that the court of appeals had misread its cases deter-
mining subjective intrusiveness: "The 'fear and surprise' to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has
been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engen-
dered in law abiding motorists by the nature of the stop." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
__ U.S. - ,110 S. Ct. 2481, 2486 (1990).
Not only is there a lack of increase in subjective intrusiveness by a sobriety checkpoint's failure to make provi-
sion for legal U-turns to avoid the checkpoint, but decisions rendered subsequent to Sitz have also found that at-
tempts to avoid checkpoints - such as by making a legal U-turn prior to passing the checkpoint's point of entry -
provide officers manning the checkpoint reasonable suspicion upon which to pursue and stop the vehicle. See,
e.g., State v. Thill, 474 N.W.2d 86, 88 (S.D. 1991) (defendant's attempted avoidance of police roadblock by
turning around in driveway prior to entering roadblock and then embarking on a "circuitous route" created an
articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and justified a seizure of the defendant's vehicle). See
also State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Me. 1990) (defendant's action in switching position with passenger
prior to entering roadblock gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion which justified a stop of the defendant's
vehicle). Cf Snyder v. State, 538 N.E.2d 961,965 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (making turnaround gives rise to a "spe-
cific and articulable fact" justifying seizure); State v. Hester, 584 A.2d 256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(upheld use of "pursuit vehicle" at sobriety checkpoint, ruling that a motorist need not have the opportunity to
avoid a checkpoint for the checkpoint to be constitutional).
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the intensity of the investigation at sobriety checkpoints is relatively minor,3"2 there
is substantial evidence that the Sitz Court's implicit finding of the reasonableness
of the duration of a seizure at a sobriety checkpoint is unsubstantiated. 3 There-
fore, it is evident that the objective intrusiveness of sobriety checkpoints cannot
properly be deemed "minimal" in all cases. Thus, the objective intrusiveness
alone of any particular sobriety checkpoint may well be sufficient to definitively
conclude the analysis of the Camara Court's final consideration of the severity of
intrusion of the challenged enforcement activity.
There is additionally the subjective nature of the intrusion effectuated by the
sobriety checkpoint seizure which must be considered. Though the Sitz Court
found an absence of "fear and surprise" generated in law-abiding motorists by so-
briety checkpoints, the Court's sole rationale for this determination was based
upon reliance on Martinez-Fuerte and the purported comparability of sobriety
checkpoints to Martinez-Fuerte's permanent immigration checkpoints. The factors
302. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (quoting United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975)) (" 'All that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a
brief question or two and possibly the production of a document . . . .' "); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d
1125, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ("The objective intrusion on fourth amendment privacy and liberty interests
occasioned by this roadblock procedure was relatively minor . . . . Each [driver] was asked to produce his driv-
er's license and vehicle registration, but no further questioning took place .... ").
See also D WI Roadblocks, supra note 11, at 796 ("[Blecause the encounter is relatively brief and to the point, it
seems apparent that the objective aspects of the stop do not amount to an unconstitutional intrusion.").
Cf United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (where the Court, in considering and finding
the intrusion upon motorists occasioned by the investigation following a stop by a roving patrol to be modest,
noted that"[t]here is no search of the vehicle or its occupants, and the visual inspection is limited to those parts of
the vehicle that can be seen by anyone standing alongside.").
But see Curbing the Drunk Driver, supra note 4, at 1485 ("The apprehension of drunk drivers . . . usually re-
quires an extended DWI investigation involving an intrusive battery of tests. This intrusion goes far beyond the
brief questioning of motorists at immigration checkpoints . . . .") (footnotes omitted); Exploring the Constitu-
tionalLimits, supra note 5, at 603 ("[A]t a typical DWI roadblock all stopped motorists would undergo intense
visual inspection and questioning."); Toll on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 994-95 ("[T]he objective
intrusion at DUI roadblocks is highly personal. At DUI roadblocks the police closely examine the driver's de-
meanor, coordination, eyes, speech, and breath. Although the stop may be brief, the examination is highly per-
sonal and intense.") (footnotes omitted).
But cf Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) ("It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.").
303. The Sitz Court recognized in the statement of facts to its opinion that "[tihe average delay for each vehicle
was approximately 25 seconds." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, ___U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2481,
2484 (1990). The Sitz majority, however, failed to again consider this aspect of objective intrusiveness in its anal-
ysis. Thus, one must assume that the Sitz majority found this to be a reasonable length of detention. Nevertheless,
it is not at all certain that the average sobriety checkpoint detention is comparable to this reasonable twenty-five
second detention. See, e.g., Colorado v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 485 (Col. 1990) (en banc) (average stop was three
minutes in duration); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ("the average length of
time each driver was stopped was two to three minutes"); State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992,
993 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) ("Vehicles were detained from 30-40 seconds to 5 minutes . . ").
See generally Supreme Court OKs Sobriety Roadblocks, San Francisco Chron., June 15, 1990, at Al ("initial
screening takes less than thirty seconds"); FiveArrestedat City's First Checkpoint for Sobriety, L.A. Times, Dec.
30, 1985, at 6, col. 6 ("Vehicles were backed up two blocks throughout the operation. The delay to motorists-
. . . varied from 3 to 3-1/2 minutes."); Sobriety Checkpoint Snares More Controversy Than Suspects, The Wash-
ington Post, Jan. 2, 1985, at DI (reporting a delay of approximately five minutes); Police Roadblocks in D. C. Nab
43forDrunk Driving, The Washington Post, June 26, 1983, at B I ("Traffic backed up more than a mile . . . and




found in Martinez-Fuerte as contributing to a diminished subjective intrusion on
motorists-" '[a]t traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion [as he would in the case of
roving patrol stops]"' 304- were adopted by the Sitz majority without any accompa-
nying analysis to support the finding that "[t]he intrusion resulting from the brief
stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable
from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuere."3"' The Sitz majority's re-
liance upon Martinez-Fuerte, however, is unjustified.
In adopting Martinez-Fuerte as support for its finding that sobriety checkpoints
do not generate fear and surprise in law-abiding motorists, the Sitz Court failed to
take cognizance of the distinguishing fact that the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte
were permanently located, a significant consideration in the Martinez-Fuerte
Court's intrusiveness analysis." 6 The permanence of the checkpoint location was
decisive in the Martinez-Fuerte Court's finding that there should be no "surprise"
generated in law-abiding motorists by operation of the checkpoints. This perma-
nence, however, is not present in the case of sobriety checkpoints where such a
characteristic would substantially impair the effectiveness of the checkpoints in
304. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 894-95 (1975)).
305. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, __ U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990).
306. "Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the
location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere." Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
See generally 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 75-76 (2d ed. 1987).
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detecting drunken drivers."' Indeed, Justice Stevens recognized that "[s]urprise is
crucial to its method."30 8
Though the element of "surprise," present by design in sobriety checkpoints and
not present in the Martinez-Fuerte permanent checkpoints, is alone sufficient to
justify a finding of a much higher level of subjective intrusiveness at sobriety
checkpoints, this is not the only flaw in the Sitz Court's unreasoned adoption of
Martinez-Fuerte in ascertaining the subjective intrusiveness of sobriety check-
points. In the case of permanent immigration checkpoints, the checkpoints are es-
tablished in permanent locations within a reasonable distance of the national
border; these two characteristics of permanent immigration checkpoints evidence
that local residents are both aware of the location of the checkpoint and the pur-
pose of the checkpoint at all times. Such characteristics strongly suggest that the
relatively infrequent traveler would also be aware of the purpose of the check-
point. These characteristics of permanent immigration checkpoints evidently sup-
port the Martinez-Fuerte Court's finding that these checkpoints are less likely than
roving patrol stops to frighten or annoy motorists. In contrast, the absence of these
307. See, e.g., People v. Bartley, 466 N.E.2d 346, 348 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) ("In reality, DUI roadblocks are
designed to be set up at night, without warning and at locations which are constantly changing."); Colorado v.
Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 492 (Col. 1990) (en banc) (Quinn, J., dissenting) ("[A] temporary sobriety checkpoint
...often depends for its effectiveness on the element of surprise."). The significance of the Martinez-Fuerte
"permanence" and the reliance upon "surprise" by sobriety checkpoints is reflected in State v. Olgaard, 248
N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976):
Neither the defendants in the instant case nor other motorists had prior knowledge of the roadblock in
question and presumably could not have acquired such knowledge, for by its very nature the roadblock
was set up to stop without prior warning, and perforce by surprise, all motorists who happened to pass
that particular point on the night in question.
Id. at 394.
4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE 76 (2d ed. 1987) ("[the checkpoints] would soon have little utility if they
remained perpetually in the same place.").
Cf State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) ("[Temporary sobriety checkpoints are] in no
way the type of permanent checkpoint approved for a limited purpose in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.") (ci-
tation omitted).
308. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2490 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Not only does this element of "surprise" significantly increase the subjective intrusiveness of a sobri-
ety checkpoint, but the allegedly vital utilization of "surprise" in an enforcement agency's modus operandi for ef-
fective enforcement may also be an insufficient justification for waiver of a warrant. In an enforcement case
analogous to those involving sobriety checkpoints, the Court considered the Secretary of Labor's argument that
"surprise" was crucial to the effective enforcement of certain provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA), and opined:
The Secretary submits that warrantless inspections are essential to the proper enforcement of OSHA be-
cause they afford the opportunity to inspect without prior notice and hence to preserve the advantages of
surprise. While the dangerous conditions outlawed by the Act include structural defects that cannot be
quickly hidden or remedied, the Act also regulates a myriad of safety details that may be amenable to
speedy alteration or disguise. The risk is that during the interval between an inspector's intial request to
search . . . and his procuring a warrant following the owner's refusal of permission, violations of this
latter type could be corrected and thus escape the inspector's notice. To the suggestion that warrants may
be issued exparte and executed without delay and without prior notice, thereby preserving the element of
surprise, the Secretary expresses concern for the administrative strain that would be experienced by the
inspection system, and by the courts, should ex parte warrants issued in advance become standard prac-
tice.
We are unconvinced, however, that requiring warrants to inspect will impose serious burdens on the
inspection system or the courts, will prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or will make
them less effective.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978) (emphasis added).
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characteristics in the operation of sobriety checkpoints fosters fear and annoy-
ance. 3 9 Motorists approaching many sobriety checkpoints are not privy to the
purpose of the stop nor do the motorists have advance notice of the location of the
sobriety checkpoint.310 For these reasons, sobriety checkpoints are not suffi-
ciently analogous to Martinez-Fuerte's permanent immigration checkpoints to jus-
tify the Sitz Court's seemingly unquestionable reliance upon that decision in
determining that sobriety checkpoints do not generate fear and surprise in law-
abiding motorists. This is, of course, unless one chooses to adopt the rationale for
validating roadblock stops forwarded by Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Delaware
v. Prouse:
311
Because motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be "frightened" or
"annoyed" when stopped en masse, a highway patrolman needs neither probable
cause nor articulable suspicion to stop all motorists on a particular thoroughfare, but
he cannot without articulable suspicion stop less than all motorists. The Court thus
elevates the adage "misery loves company" to a novel role in Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence.312
Therefore, since sobriety checkpoints are aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime 313 and also exhibit characteristics evidencing potential substantial objective
and subjective intrusion on the rights of motorists,31 sobriety checkpoints cannot
be found to satisfy the third "persuasive" consideration of the Camara Court.
Thus, none of the three factors which the Camara Court found "persuasive" as
justification for a reduction of the traditional standard of probable cause to one of
"reasonableness ' ' 1 is present in the context of sobriety checkpoints. As a result,
309. Cf Stark v. Perpich, 590 F Supp. 1057, 1061 (D. Minn. 1984) (finding that the roadblock seizures are
"inconvenient, annoying, and even frightening to motorists"); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984):
The fear factor ... is heightened by the presence of at least ten officers, chemical testing equipment,
and mobile booking and jail vans actually on the scene. To the individual approaching such a roadblock, it
is not unlikely that he would reasonably perceive the officers as being desirous of arresting criminals and
that anyone passing through could easily be arrested.
Id. at 564.
310. See People v. Bartley, 466 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) ("Motorists are often unaware of the
reason for the stop prior to being asked to display their driver's license."); State v. McLaughlin, 871 N.E.2d
1125, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ("[N]o warning signs were posted to inform the approaching motorists of the
fact or purpose of the roadblock, and it is not clear that detainees were ever informed of the precise purpose of the
roadblock."). State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992, 993 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) ("No warning
signs or advance flashing lights announced the roadblock or its purpose, nor did [the Department of Public
Safety] advise drivers in advance that roadblocks would be operated .... ).
The publicity of the location of checkpoints is not only apparently constitutionally preferable, but has also been
recognized by Congress as a significant tool in the implementation of a successful alcohol traffic safety program.
Illustrative of Congress' recognition of the desirability of increased publicity of alcohol-related enforcement
measures is the Highway Safety Act of 1982 in which states are required to increase efforts to inform the public of
more aggressive enforcement of alcohol-related traffic offenses in order to qualify for certain basic and supple-
mental federal grants. Highway Safety Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1738, 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1982). See supra note 4.
311. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
312. Id. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
313. See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 297-312 and accompanying text.
315. See supm notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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the Sitz Court's validation of sobriety checkpoints by employment of the reason-
ableness balancing test3" 6 is ill-founded. The Sitz Court's failure to consider the
purposes and rationale underlying the origination and development of the reason-
ableness balancing test has resulted in a decision upholding sobriety checkpoints
through application of an inappropriate standard for Fourth Amendment analysis.
There are none of Camara 's "persuasive" factors present with sobriety checkpoints
to justify the Sitz Court's abandonment of the traditional standard of probable
cause, under which requirement sobriety checkpoints would almost certainly be
doomed.
B. Applicability of Warrant Requirement
"The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead language." 317 Never-
theless, the Sitz Court upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints without
even casual mention of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In-
deed, "[t]he Court's implication that the balancing test is the rule rather than the
exception is troubling .... "318 This is particularly true given the rationales un-
derlying previous decisions considering whether a warrant should be required in
various administrative search contexts. As will be shown, none of these rationales
support abandonment of the warrant requirement for sobriety checkpoints.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,31 9 the Supreme Court considered whether the
public interest involved in code-enforcement housing inspections was sufficient
justification to permit warrantless administrative searches. 20 In finding no reason
why these inspection programs could not be effectively carried out pursuant to a
reasonable search warrant requirement, 321 the Camara Court opined:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the pub-
lic interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to
search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search.322
316. See supra notes 167-99 and accompanying text.
317. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
318. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709 (1987):
[O]nly when the practical realities of a particular situation suggest that a government official cannot ob-
tain a warrant based upon probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a search would
contribute, does the Court turn to a "balancing" test to formulate a standard of reasonableness for this
context.
Id. at 741.
But see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) ("Where a careful balancing of governmental and pri-
vate interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness
that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.") (emphasis added).
319. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).





Following Camara's reasoning, sobriety checkpoints should be subject to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Despite the gravity of the public
interest involved with sobriety checkpoints, there is no evidence to suggest that re-
quiring law enforcement officials to obtain a judicially-issued warrant prior to im-
plementation of the sobriety checkpoint would "frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search." '323 This is true even though the sobriety checkpoints
rely in large measure upon the element of "surprise" for their effectiveness '24 In-
deed, procurement of a warrant from a magistrate is not likely to be publicly
broadcasted.
In considering the constitutionality of roving border patrols, the Supreme
Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States325 found no reason why a warrant system
could not be constructed for operation of these roving patrols which would be "fea-
sible and meaningful."326 The Court found that the feasibility of obtaining a war-
rant in advance of the seizure was evidenced by the fact that the crime-the
transportation of illegal aliens- will occur on certain, predictable roads and that
the searches would be executed according to a predetermined plan.327 These same
factors are readily recognizable in consideration of sobriety checkpoints. The
crime-drunken driving-will predominantly occur on certain, predictable
roads328 and the checkpoints will be operated in accordance with a predetermined
323. Id. See 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 78 (2d ed. 1987) ("Because [sobriety checkpoints] are planned
well in advance, there is no reason why the prior approval of a magistrate could not be obtained.")
324. See supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
325. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
326. Id. at 283.
327. Id.
328. Areas targeted for sobriety checkpoints include "strips" on which there are located a number of establish-
ments which serve alcoholic beverages and roads on which there has been a high rate of arrest for drunken driv-
ing. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2481,2487 (1990) ("checkpoints
are selected pursuant to the guidelines").
See also id. at 2484 ("Under the guidelines, checkpoints would be set up at selected sites along state roads.");
King v. State, 816 S.W.2d 447,449 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (" 'target sites' . . . consist of areas that, based on data
accrued in the two previous years, have a high probability of DWI violations, other violations, fatalities, and
serious injuries"); id. (roadblock conducted at area concentrated with bars and restaurants).
Cf State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Me. 1990) (Glassman, J., dissenting) (suggesting that officers
have knowledge that "area [is] known for unusual number of safety violations" before conducting sobriety check-
point).
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plan.329 Thus, there is no reason why a warrant system could not be devised for the
operation of sobriety checkpoints which is both "feasible and meaningful."330
In New Jersey v. TL. .,331 the Court relied upon Camara in finding that the bur-
den of requiring school officials to obtain a warrant prior to subjecting a student
under their authority to a search "'is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search.' "332 Utilization of this rationale for not requiring a warrant in
the context of sobriety checkpoints, however, has already been shown to be inap-
propriate.
Relying upon similar reasoning, the Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin334 found that
"[a] warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree with the proba-
tion system, setting up a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge
of how close a supervision the probationer requires."335 Also particularly relevant
in consideration of one of the avowed purposes of sobriety checkpoints -deter-
rence of drunken driving - is the Court's finding that "the delay inherent in obtain-
ing a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond
quickly to evidence of misconduct and would reduce the deterrent effect that the
possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create."336
Once again, however, the requirement of obtaining a warrant prior to operation
of a sobriety checkpoint would not interfere to any "appreciable degree"337 with the
effectiveness of the checkpoint. Additionally, the Griffin Court's concern that the
judgment of the probation officer would be replaced by that of a magistrate would
not be present with sobriety checkpoints. The location of sobriety checkpoints is
predetermined by high-level law enforcement officials 338 and the checkpoints are
329. See Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2484:
Under the guidelines, checkpoints would be set up at selected sites along state roads. All vehicles passing
through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. In
cases where a checkpoint officer detected signs of intoxication, the motorist would be directed to a loca-
tion out of the traffic flow where an officer would check the motorist's driver's license and car registra-
tion and, if warranted, conduct further sobriety tests. Should the field tests and the officer's observations
suggest that the driver was intoxicated, an arrest would be made. All other drivers would be permitted to
resume their journey immediately.
The limit on an officer's discretion is a vital consideration in Fourth Amendment analysis of challenged en-
forcement activities. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). "[Tlhe Fourth Amendment requires
that a seizure . . . must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct
of individual officers." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-62 (1976)).
330. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283 (1973).
331. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
332. Id. at 340 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
333. See supra notes 320-24 and accompanying text.
334. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
335. Id. at 876.
336. Id. (citations omitted). Similar reasoning was previously rejected by the Court in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978), where the Court rejected the Secretary of Labor's contention that requiring a
warrant prior to certain inspections of businesses would allow the business owner to disguise violations and,
thus, reduce the effectiveness of and seriously burden the inspection program. See supra note 307 and accompa-
nying text.
337. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
338. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
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operated in accordance with pre-established guidelines.339 Thus, a magistrate
need not engage in "second-guessing" the modus operandi of the checkpoint but,
rather, merely make a determination as to the existence of probable cause for es-
tablishment of the checkpoint. Similarly, the Griffin Court's finding that requiring
a warrant would reduce the deterrent effect is inapplicable to sobriety checkpoints.
This reasoning was founded on the premise that obtaining a warrant would reduce
the speed in which officials could respond to misconduct. This element of "speed
of reaction" is not relevant in the case of sobriety checkpoints. In fact, the effective
functioning of a sobriety checkpoint requires a carefully planned and coordinated
effort by and among law enforcement officials340 as evidenced by the customary
usage of eight to twelve officers in a checkpoint's operation.341
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Association342 considered whether a war-
rant should be required before subjecting railroad employees involved in certain
types of accidents to mandated drug testing . 3 ' The Skinner Court first opined that
"[a]n essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by
assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the ran-
dom or arbitrary acts of government agents "33 and that "[a] warrant assures the
citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is narrowly limited in its
339. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Trumble, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (Mass. 1985); Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp.
1057 (D. Minn. 1984); State v. Golden, 317 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. App. 1984); Little v. State, 499 A.2d 903 (Md.
1984). See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
See also State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that pre-established guidelines by high
ranking officials is not sufficient; not only must there be pre-established guidelines, but the checkpoint must also
first have specific legislation authorizing implementation).
The failure of law enforcement to conduct sobriety checkpoints in accord with pre-established guidelines ren-
ders the checkpoints unconstitutional. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text. See State v. Kitchen, 808
P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1991):
Applying Brown and Sitz to the case at bar, we hold that the roadblock herein was not conducted pursuant
to an explicit, neutral plan, nor was it constitutionally permissible under the Brown balancing test.
Unlike the plan in Sitz, the plan before us was prepared by the actual officer who conducted the road-
block, rather than by a neutral body. We question the neutrality of any plan which is authored by the same
person whose actions the plan is purported to limit. Secondly, the purpose of the plan in Sitz was to pro-
vide guidelines for the conducting of roadblocks in general, whereas the plan before us was formed with
this specific roadblock in mind. Thirdly, unlike the plan in Sitz, there is no evidence that the plan pro-
vided explicit guidelines, beyond the direction to stop only automobiles and light trucks. The guidelines in
any plan must, at a minimum, be specific enough to prevent "arbitrary invasions" enacted "solely at the
unfettered discretion of officers in the field."
Kitchen, 808 P.2d at 1130 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
Some states additionally require that the guidelines be legislatively developed. See, e.g., King v. State, 816
S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (absence of a "legislatively developed administrative scheme" for con-
ducting the checkpoint - as was present in Sitz - renders the checkpoint unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (sobriety
checkpoints are per se unconstitutional under the state constitution absent specific legislative authorization).
340. See State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983).
341. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
342. .U-U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
343. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
344. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415.
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objectives and scope." '345 The Court further noted that "[a] warrant also provides
the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective deter-
mination whether an intrusion is justified in any given case."3" The Skinner
Court, however, ruled that requiring a warrant in this particular case, where
"[bloth the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible lim-
its of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically in the regulations that
authorize them, and doubtless are well known to covered employees , 311 would
not serve to promote the aims of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.348
Requiring a warrant in the context of sobriety checkpoints, however, will serve
to promote these dual purposes of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
Not only will a warrant requirement provide assurance to citizens that the sobriety
checkpoints are not established in pursuance of random or arbitrary governmental
action, but requiring a warrant will also ensure that there has been an objective
determination as to whether there is sufficient probable cause to justify an intru-
sion at any particular location ab initio. Additionally, the Skinner Court's rationale
in not requiring a warrant is clearly not applicable in consideration of sobriety
checkpoints. The permissible limits of the intrusion accompanying the operation
of sobriety checkpoints are neither "narrowly and specifically"349 defined nor is
the permissible scope of the attendant intrusion known to the motoring public.
Perhaps the most compelling support for requiring a warrant in the case of so-
briety checkpoints is found in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,3 ' a
decision rendered by the Court on the same day that Skinner was decided. In Von
Raab, the Court found that "every employee who seeks a transfer to a covered po-
sition knows that he must take a drug test, and is likewise aware of the procedures
the [Customs] Service must follow in administering the test."3 1 Relying upon the
same rationale as employed in Skinner, the Von Raab Court similarly found that
"'the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of
such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically . . . ,and doubtless are well
known to covered employees.' "352 The Court proceeded to justify this finding:
"The process becomes automatic when the employee elects to apply for, and there-
after pursue, a covered position. Because the Service does not make a discretion-
345. Id. (citations omitted). Accord Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) ("A war-
rant . . . would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitu-
tion, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.")
(footnote omitted).




350. -. U.S.__ , 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
351. Id. at 1391.




ary determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are
present, there are simply 'no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.' ""
Again, as in Skinner, the same consideration of advance notice of the permissi-
ble scope of the intrusion found in Von Raab is not present in sobriety checkpoints.
"[A] discretionary determination to [seize] based on a judgment that certain con-
ditions are present"354 is, however, found in the context of sobriety checkpoints.
Though sobriety checkpoints are obviously distinguishable from random stops by
roving patrols which have been held unconstitutional because of the field officer's
unconstrained discretion in effectuating the stop,355 the location of sobriety check-
points is the result of a discretionary determination by high-level law enforcement
officials "based on a judgment that certain conditions are present."356 There is no
reason why high-level law enforcement officials making a discretionary determi-
nation as to the location of a sobriety checkpoint -based on such factors being
present as the high arrest rate for drunken driving in a particular area - should not
be equated with the Von Raab Court's proposition affording significance to the fact
that the Customs Service did not "make a discretionary determination to search
based on ajudgment that certain conditions are present. '357 Thus, though sobriety
checkpoints alleviate the fear that the field officer might exercise unbridled discre-
tion in the seizure of motorists, 35" the Von Raab holding suggests that discretionary
determinations by high-level officials as to the location of sobriety checkpoints
353. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)) (emphasis
added).
354. Id.
355. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
356. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
There remains undecided the issue of discretionfollowing the seizure as a result of the Sitz Court's explicit refusal
to consider the issue. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485
(1990).
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may not be justified absent a warrant as this provides "'special facts for a neutral
magistrate to evaluate.' ,359
C. "Effectiveness"Eliminated
1. Dicta Doom
Not only did the Sitz Court's application of the reasonableness balancing test to
sobriety checkpoints result in an erroneous determination of the satisfaction of
Fourth Amendment standards, but the Sitz Court's application of the reasonable-
ness balancing test also eliminated the "effectiveness" review from the reasonable-
ness balancing test.360 In considering the "effectiveness" factor found in the
reasonableness balancing test as expressed in Brown v. Texas,361 the Sitz Court
opined that "[t]his passage from Brown was not meant to transfer from politically
359. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, __U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1391 (1989)
(quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967):
It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint
was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before com-
mencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magis-
trate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits
established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been com-
pleted, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such
safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably ex-
pected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive
means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful "notwith-
standing facts unquestionably showing probable cause."
Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)).
See also 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 77 (2d ed. 1987) ("[I]t would be open to a defendant challenging a
sobriety checkpoint to bring into question the validity of the decision as to when and where it would be oper-
ated.").
But see Sherri Ann Carver, Comment, The Battle of the Balancing Tests in the Fourth Amendment Drug Testing
Cases: Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association- The Proper Balance Is Struck, 15 OKLA. CITY U.L.
REv. 333,358 (1990) ("Support for the Court's decisions can be found by analogizing Skinner and [National Trea-
sury Employees Union v. I Von Raab to roadblock cases.").
360. States are apparently wasting little time in taking full advantage of this carte blanche aspect of the Court's
decision. In Colorado v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 488-89 (Colo. 1990) (en banc), the Colorado Supreme Court,
relying upon Sitz in upholding the constitutionality of a challenged sobriety checkpoint, held that, "[nlotwith-
standing the lack of any driving-under-the-influence arrests at the ...checkpoint, we conclude that the check-
point reasonably advanced the state's interest in combatting drunken driving."
There are, however, jurisdictions continuing to recognize the vitality of the "effectiveness" prong in the Brown
balancing analysis. See, e.g., State v. Van Natta, 805 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing the ne-
cessity of "effectiveness" and requiring, at a minimum, a prima facie showing by the police of the sobriety check-
point's effectiveness in order to uphold the constitutionality of the checkpoint); State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127
(Utah Ct. App. 1991):
[Tihe second prong of the Brown test, the degree to which the roadblock advances the public interest, has
not been met. First, there was no finding as to whether this roadblock advanced the aforementioned pub-
lic interest. Moreover, there is a paucity of evidence, empirical or otherwise, that this roadblock accom-
plished any of the purposes for which it was conducted. In Sitz, in addition to data as to the number of
arrests made, records were kept as to the number of vehicles stopped, the number subject to further inves-
tigation, and the length of the delay involved. Here, only the number of violations were recorded. Addi-
tionally, in Sitz, expert testimony was received as to the effectiveness of roadblocks in advancing
detection of drunk drivers; here, no such expert testimony was offered. In short, no evidence was offered
or received to support a finding that this roadblock advanced the interests for which it was conducted and,
therefore, this prong of the Brown test has not been met.
Kitchen, 808 P. 2d at 1131 (footnote omitted).
361. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ("the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest").
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accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alter-
native law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious pub-
lic danger."362 In removing the "effectiveness" review from judicial consideration
of a challenged law enforcement measure, the Sitz majority reasoned that "for pur-
poses of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among . . . reasonable alterna-
tives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of,
and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of po-
lice officers."363 It is indeed ironic that the Court would utilize sobriety check-
points to afford law enforcement officials this range of discretion where there are,
in fact, alternative means available which are both more "efficient"364 and more
"effective."
365
2. One Down, One to Go
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Sitz Court's elimination of "effective-
ness" from judicial review is that this reduces the reasonableness balancing test to
but two considerations: (1) the gravity of the public interest, and (2) the severity of
the intrusion on individual liberties. Such a minimized test opens Pandora's box to
a myriad of state actions which may in fact be "ineffective" when there is perceived
to be a weighty social goal. The only remaining limitation on such arbitrary police
action is the severity of the intrusion which will accompany that action. In light of
the Supreme Court's most recent decisions in which the Court has utilized the rea-
sonableness balancing test, 366 however, this limitation approaches transparency.
Ominously, the similarity to a police state367 will increase as the Court continues to
increase the severity of intrusion on individual liberties allowed.
362. Sitz, __ U.S.__ , 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
363. Id. See Establishing Roadblocks supra note 1:
The Court has decided that it will leave decisions as to the appropriate weapon with which to fight
drunk driving to the police administrators. The Court decided not to deprive the police of this potentially
effective tool. The Court's decision was made by assigning more importance to the potential for arresting
drunk drivers at these temporary roadblocks . . . than to the intrusion on large numbers of law-abiding
motorists. This decision was made in total disregard of the data presented and cited by the Court and in
Justice Stevens' dissent. The Court owes the public a more cogent explanation than the one it pro-
vided ....
Id. at57.
See also Sitz, _ U.S _ , 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2490 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In the face of the
momentary evil' of drunken driving, the Court today abdicates its role as the protector of [the] fundamental right
[to be let alone].").
Cf Susan Haberbarger, Comment, Reasonable Searches Absent Individualized Suspicion: Is There a Drug- Test-
ing Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement After Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Associa-
tion?, 12 U. HAW. L. RaV. 343, 381 (1990) ("The most notable aspect of the decision is the Supreme Court's
grant of broad discretion to the government in its war on drugs .... ") (emphasis added).
364. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
366. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990); Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives' Ass'n, __U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); National Treasury Employees Un-
ion v. Von Raab, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
367. See State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Me. 1990) (society best served by regime that uses road-
blocks). Cf State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 983 (N.H. 1985); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Cr. App.
1984).
19911
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum
3 68
"I suspect that this case is a prime example of the adage that 'bad facts make bad
law.' "3169 Evident behind the Sitz decision is that the ends justify the means.
31°
There are, however, scores of opinions evidencing the folly of promulgating un-
constitutional laws and utilizing unconstitutional measures to counter a threaten-
ing menace. 71 Indeed, "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic government ....
Though directed at consideration of presidential powers in a state of emergency,
the following statement by Justice Jackson accurately depicts the impetus of the
Sitz Court's ruling: "The plea is for a resulting power to deal with a crisis or an
368. "Let justice be done, though the heavens may fall."
369. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925):
The damnable character of the "bootlegger's" business should not closeour eyes to the mischief which will
surely follow any attempt to destroy [the bootlegger's business] by unwarranted methods. "To press for-
ward to a great principle by breaking through every other great principle that stands in the way of its estab-
lishment; . . . in short, to procure an eminent good by means that are unlawful is as little consonant to
private morality as to public justice."
Id. at 163 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (quoting Sir William Scott, The Le Louis, 2 Dodson 210, 257).
370. See also State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) ("[S]tate agencies have ignored the
presumption of innocence [in implementing sobriety checkpoints], assuming that criminal conduct must be oc-
curring on the roads . . . , and have taken an 'ends justifies the means' approach.").
371. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, - U.S. - , 109S. Ct. 1384, 1401
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point;
that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause . . . , cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable
search."); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,273 (1973) ("The needs of law enforcement stand in
constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It
is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards."); id.
at 274 ("The Court that decided Carroll v. United States . . . sat during a period in our history when the Nation
was confronted with a law enforcement problem of no small magnitude-the enforcement of the Prohibition
laws. But that Court resisted the pressure of official expedience against the guarantee of the Fourth Amend-
ment.") (citation omitted); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935):
Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. The constitution established a
national government with powers deemed to be adequate, . . . but these powers of the national govern-
ment are limited by constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend
the imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary.
Id. at 528-29 (footnotes omitted).
Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There have been powerful hydraulic
pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give
the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.").
372. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
[Tihe concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely
when we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and other
benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them from the pressures of
a turbulent life around them and give them the health and strength to carry on.
White, 401 U.S. at 756.
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emergency according to the necessities of the case, the unarticulated assumption
being that necessity knows no law."
373
B. Alarming Repercussions
The Sitz Court's decision, requiring neither a warrant nor even reasonable sus-
picion as grounds for seizures at sobriety checkpoints, clearly evidences the
Court's continued willingness to subject private citizens to arbitrary state action
where there is a perceived weighty social objective. 374 The Sitz opinion is indeed
consistent with the two most recent Fourth Amendment cases decided by the
Court, where the Court found that "[t]he government may take all necessary and
reasonable regulatory steps to prevent or deter . . . hazardous conduct"375 and
that "[t]hese substantial interests . . . present a special need that may justify de-
parture from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements."376
Though law enforcement advocates and politically active citizens' groups, as
well as others, may scoff at forecasts of a trend toward arbitrary state police
373. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1398(1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("While there are some absolutes in Fourth Amendment law, as soon as those have been
left behind and the question comes down to whether a particular search has been 'reasonable,' the answer depends
largely upon the social necessity that prompts the search.") (emphasis added).
374. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), where the
Court recently upheld mandated drug and alcohol testing for ailroad employees involved in certain types of acci-
dents:
The possession of unlawful drugs is a criminal offense that the Government may punish, but it is a sepa-
rate and far more dangerous wrong to perform certain sensitive tasks while under the influence of those
substances. Performing those tasks while impaired by alcohol is, of course, equally dangerous, though
consumption of alcohol is legal in most other contexts. The Government may take all necessary and rea-
sonable regulatory steps to prevent or deter that hazardous conduct ....
Id. at 1421 (emphasis added).
Also illustrative of this proposition is National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
- U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), where the Court upheld mandatory drug testing as a prerequisite to
certain positions within the Customs Service:
The purposes of the program are to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive posi-
tions within the Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to those positions. These substantial
interests.., present a special need that may justify departure from the ordinary warrant and probable
cause requirements.
Id. at 1390-91 (emphasis added).
Cf Comment, Reasonable Searches Absent Individualized Suspicion: Is There a Drug-Testing Exception to the
Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement After Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association?, 12 U. HAw.
L. REV. 343, 380 (1990) ("This newly created exception to the warrant requirement will most likely encourage
future drug-testing programs, especially if their justifications lie within the ambit of securing public safety.") (em-
phasis added).
375. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421. The Skinner requirement that the regulatory steps not only be "necessary" but
also "reasonable" is assumedly satisfied by the Sitz Court's finding that sobriety checkpoints satisfy the require-
ments of the reasonableness balancing test.
376. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390-91. The Sitz Court interestingly, however, rejected the motorists' contention
that Von Raab provided the standard by which sobriety checkpoints should be judged, Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990), pointing out that Von Raab both cited and
discussed the Court's previous decisions concerning police stops of motorists with approval and, thus, those
cases were the relevant authorities in the context of sobriety checkpoints. Nevertheless, it is patently clear from
the Court's continual willingness to rely upon the gravity of the public interest-at the practical exclusion of con-
sideration of the effectiveness of an activity and the resultant intrusion- in upholding challenged state actions,
that the Sitz Court might have just as easily relied upon Von Raab in reaching its desired ruling.
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action, previous decisions of the Supreme Court certainly justify such concern.377
The Court's most recent decisions permitting the state to invade individual liber-
ties amplify this concern 3" and reflect the trend of the Court in reducing the
Fourth Amendment to mere platitude. 379 Due recognition, however, must be ac-
corded the proposition that these invasions on individual liberties are in pursuance
of a perceived weighty social objective which represents a grave and legitimate in-
terest of the state. Nevertheless, as Justice Douglas recognized in Terry v. Ohio,
380
"if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, . . . we enter a new regime."381
The Orwellian consequences of further reductions of the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment are readily apparent. Random police searches of private resi-
dents for illegal drugs might be easily justified in such a system as well as countless
377. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), Justice Brennan compiled a brief history of the
Court's decisions evidencing this trend.
Today's decision evidences the continuing evisceration of the Fourth Amendment protections against un-
reasonable searches and seizures . . . . Texas v. White permitted the warrantless search of an automo-
bile in police custody despite the unreasonableness of the custody and opportunity to obtain a warrant.
United States v. Watson held that regardless of whether opportunity exists to obtain a warrant, an arrest in
a public place for a previously committed felony never requires a warrant . . . . United States v. Santana
went further and approved the warrantless arrest for a felony of a person standing on the front porch of her
residence. United States v. Miller narrowed the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy by denying
the existence of a protectible interest in the compilation of checks, deposit slips, and other records per-
taining to an individual's bank account. Stone v. Powell precluded the assertion of Fourth Amendment
claims in federal collateral relief proceedings. United States v. Janis held that evidence unconstitutionally
seized by a state officer is admissible in a civil proceeding by or against the United States. South Dakota v.
Opperman approved sweeping inventory searches of automobiles in police custody irrespective of the
particular circumstances of the case. Finally, in Andresen v. Maryland, the Court, in practical effect,
weakened the Fourth Amendment prohibition against general warrants.
Id. at 567-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See also State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) ("The Court finds [sobriety check-
points], while commendable in their ultimate goal of removing DUI offenders from the public highways, draw
dangerously close to what may be referred to as a police state.").
378. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, - U.S. ,110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990); Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives' Ass'n, - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); National Treasury Employees Un-
ion v. Von Raab, -U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). See also supra note 258.
379. One may consider the fate of the Tenth Amendment in this regard:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing
in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or
that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers
not granted ....
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (emphasis added).
Cf National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, __ U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989)
(Court recognized "the longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure
of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance.") (emphasis
added); Comment, Reasonable Searches Absent Individualized Suspicion: Is There a Drug-Testing Exception to the
Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement After Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association?, 12 U. HAw.
L. REV. 343, 380 (1990) ("[Railway Labor] and [National Treasury Employees Union v. I Von Raab . . . continue
the Court's 'erosion of the fourth amendment' by creating a 'drug-testing exception' to the warrant requirement.")
(footnotes omitted).
380. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
381. Id. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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other invasions of basic individual freedoms '82 Would not such a system permit
law enforcement officials to seize every citizen driving a General Motors car
within an area where there had been a rash of recent auto thefts, of which a large
majority of the vehicles stolen were General Motors cars? Would the state in fact
need to show that there is a grave and legitimate state interest to be served by the
seizure? People v. Meitz383 suggests not. Indeed, given the trend of decisions, the
potential repercussions of the Sitz decision are not nearly as speculative as they
are alarming.'84 The Sitz decision, in fact, upholds an enforcement activity re-
markably similar to those executed under the despised general writs of assistance
issued during colonial times. s85
C. Feasibility of Warrant Requirement
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be sub-
jected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the rea-
sonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.386
In view of this long-recognized principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
Sitz Court's neglect of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is unjustified.
Furthermore, a review of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions not requiring the
382. See State v. Folsom, No. 90-CA-1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 2, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allstates library) (Milligan,
J., concurring):
I . . . [write] separately only to forewarn that the next generation of challenges to traffic stops resulting
in D.U.I. arrests will face the impact of [Sitz]. When considering the federal constitutional prohibitions
of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution legitimate questions can be raised as to whether artic-
ulable suspicion, followed by probable cause, is any longer required in a singular traffic stop. If the police
can stop and minimally detain all of the traffic, why can't they stop a single operator?
Id. at 2 (citing Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, -U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990)).
See generally A Sobering Look, supra note 11, at 604 ("It is not far-fetched to assume . . . that the the [sic]
Court could use a decision upholding the constitutionality of DUI roadblocks to permit a myriad of intrusions on
a person's right to travel freely either on foot or in car.").
383. 420 N.E.2d 1119 (111. App. 1981) (Upholding the seizure of the defendant two blocks from the site of a
stakeout which had been established to investigate a rash of recent auto thefts from an apartment complex. The
defendant was detained without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion because he was driving a General
Motors vehicle and approximately 85 percent of the recent thefts were of late model General Motors vehicles).
384. See Colorado Upholds Constitutuinality of Sobriety Stops at Fixed Checkpoint, 59 U.S.L.W. 1103 (Jan. 8,
1991) (reporting that a sobriety checkpoint recently upheld as constitutional under both the federal and Colorado
state constitutions was both more intrusive and less effective than the checkpoint approved in Sitz).
See also State v. Hester, 584 A.2d 256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (upheld use of "pursuit vehicle" at
sobriety checkpoint, ruling that a motorist need not have the opportunity to avoid a checkpoint for the checkpoint
to be constitutional).
385. "What a scene does this open! Every man prompted by revenge, ill humour or wantonness to inspect the
inside of his neighbour's house, may get a writ of assistance; . . . one arbitrary exertion will provoke another,
until society will be involved in tumult and in blood." THE ADAMS PAPERS 143 (L. Butterfield ed. 1968) (reporting
James Otis' argument against the writs of assistance on behalf of the colonists in the Supreme Court of Boston,
1761). See also supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
386. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
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procurement of ajudicially-issued warrant provides no basis upon which to excuse
this requirement in the context of sobriety checkpoints. 87
Requiring law enforcement officials to secure a judicially-issued warrant prior
to operation of a sobriety checkpoint would neither "frustrate the governmental
purpose"3 ' behind the checkpoint nor interfere to any "appreciable degree" 389 with
the operation of the checkpoint. Additionally, any burden placed on law enforce-
ment officials in requiring a warrant is certain to be minimal considering that this
activity is routinely performed on a daily basis by these same officials for other
enforcement purposes."' ° Thus, any additional burden imposed by a warrant re-
quirement will be one of mere "inconvenience," an insufficient justification for
circumventing the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 91
There is also insufficient justification for excusing the warrant requirement in
the premise that predetermined guidelines for operation of the checkpoints serve
387. See supra notes 317-59 and accompanying text. But see 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 77-78 (2d ed.
1987).
388. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
389. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). See supra notes 334-41 and accompanying text.
390. Cf O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987):
Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures . . . upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be
familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we
have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investi-
gating the violation of criminal laws.
Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
391. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972). "Although some added burden
will be imposed upon [the government by requiring prior judicial approval], this inconvenience is justified in a
free society to protect constitutional values." Id. See also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978)
(rejecting the contention that warrantless OSHA inspections should be permitted because of the serious burden
which would be placed upon the courts requiring procurement of a warrant prior to inspection); id. at 321- ("We
doubt that the consumption of enforcement energies in the obtaining of [the required] warrants will exceed man-
ageable proportions."); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) ("[The Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement] is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency.").
There is, however, some support for not requiring a warrant prior to an administrative search when the incon-
venience attendant with procuring a warrant in the particular context is "unduly burdensome":
[R]equiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee's office,
desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business
and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervi-
sors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (emphasis added).
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as a limitation on official discretion. Such self-imposed guidelines392 do not assure
adequate protection of constitutional rights to the motoring public.393
Finally, not only should a judicially-issued warrant be required for the opera-
tion of sobriety checkpoints, but this warrant should also be based upon the tradi-
tional standard of probable cause as required by the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment rather than upon a reduced standard predicated upon ipse dixit. That
there are generally recognized exceptions to the traditional standard of probable
cause is of no moment in the context of sobriety checkpoints, as evidenced by the
inapplicability of the reasonableness balancing test to sobriety checkpoints.394
Therefore, even in recognition of the grave and legitimate state interest in curb-
ing drunken driving, basic individual freedoms guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment such as the right to travel unimpeded,39 the right to privacy,39 ' and the right
392. Guidelines established by law enforcement officials to regulate enforcement activities do not necessarily
afford adequate constitutional safeguards to the private citizen. There is inherent in these self-imposed guidelines
a certain "conflict of interest" which has been recognized to defeat similar arguments that enforcement activities
should be permitted outside the purview of a warrant.
The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disin-
terested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prose-
cute. But those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. This historical judgment, which
the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pres-
sures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy ....
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 359-60 (1967) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
393. There is inherent in self-imposed enforcement guidelines a "conflict of interest,"see supra note 392, which
can only be avoided through intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate judging the constitutional validity
of the proposed enforcement activity. This concept of a separation of powers to regulate enforcement activities
recognizes that neither executive discretion nor policy guidelines are sufficient to ensure the constitutional valid-
ity of an enforcement activity:
The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion
may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that indi-
vidual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among
the different branches of Government.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 317 (citing John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial
Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943-44 (1963)).
Cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) ("[B]road statutory safeguards are no substitute
for individualized review . . ").
394. See supra notes 260-316 and accompanying text. Cf Colorado v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1990) (en
banc):
[T]he Sitz holding is remarkable for its failure to acknowledge the long-standing search and seizure prin-
ciple, first enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, that the temporary seizure of a person for a brief investigation is
constitutionally permissible as long as there are circumstances which, although not amounting to proba-
ble cause essential for a traditional arrest, are sufficient when judged against an objective standard to sup-
port a reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot."
Id. (Quinn, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
395. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)
("[TIhose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is . . . probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contra-
band . . ").
396. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) ("[Tlhe primary object of the Fourth Amend-
ment [is] . . . the protection of privacy .... 'The decisions of this Court have time and again underscored the
essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.' ")
(quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958)) (citations omitted).
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to be left alone, 397 can only be adequately preserved through the requirement of a
judicially-issued area warrant based on probable cause prior to the operation of a
sobriety checkpoint. 398 There is no reason that a "feasible and meaningful '399 war-
397. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 386 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("One of [the] most
cherished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment: that the government may not intrude on the per-
sonal privacy of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance.").
398. An alternative ground upon which sobriety checkpoints could be held constitutional is where the sobriety
checkpoint program utilized by state law enforcement is operated pursuant to specific legislative authorization
which includes specified criteria for the operation of the checkpoints. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
Where there is such specific legislative authorization, the checkpoints might be analogized - for constitutional
purposes - to administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691 (1987) (discussing the reasonableness of a warrantless inspection of a pervasively regulated business):
[A] warrantless inspection . . . in the context of a pervasively regulated business, will be deemed to be
reasonable only so long as three criteria are met. First, there must be a "substantial" government interest
that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made ....
Second, the warrantless inspections must be "necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme.".
Finally, "the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application,
[must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." In other words, the regulatory stat-
ute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial prem-
ises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit
the discretion of the inspecting officers ....
Burger, 482 U.S. at 711 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)) (citations omitted).
The Burger Court expounded on these factors later in its opinion, holding that the particular regulatory
scheme under consideration - inspections of automobile junkyards - "satisfies the three criteria necessary to
make reasonable warrantless inspections pursuant to [the regulatory scheme under review]." Burger, 482 U.S. at
708.
The rationales employed by the Burger Court in finding satisfaction of each of the three criteria may easily be
applied to hold constitutional a sobriety checkpoint program operated pursuant to carefully drafted, specific leg-
islative authorization. Consider:
The [state] regulatory scheme satisfies the three criteria necessary to make reasonable warrantless in-
spections pursuant to [the state's sobriety checkpoint statute]. First, the state has a substantial interest in
[detecting and removing drunken drivers from the highways because of the problems and tragedies at-
tendant with drunken driving. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.].
Second, regulation of [motorists through the use of highway sobriety checkpoints] reasonably serves the
state's substantial interest in eradicating [drunken driving].
Third, [the state's sobriety checkpoint statute] provides a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a war-
rant." The statute informs the operator of a vehicle . . . that [sobriety checkpoints will be implemented]
on a regular basis .. . .Thus, the vehicle [operator] knows that the [checkpoints] to which he is subject
do not constitute discretionary acts by a government official but are conducted pursuant to statu-
te .. . .[The statute] also sets forth the scope of the [seizure] and, accordingly, places the [motorist] on
notice as to how to comply with the statute. In addition, it notifies the [motorist] as to who is authorized to
conduct [the checkpoint].
Finally, the "time, place, and scope" of the [checkpoint] is limited . . . to place appropriate restraints
upon the discretion of the [officers conducting the checkpoint] .. . .The officers are allowed to conduct
[a checkpoint] only [during the hours specified in the statutory guidelines. The checkpoints may stop
only every x-numbered vehicle]. And the permissible scope of these [seizures] is narrowly defined: [the
checkpoint officers may only examine the motorist's demeanor and ask the motorist a short series of ques-
tions specifically provided by statute].
Burger, 482 U.S. at 708-11 (citations omitted).




rant system could not be designed such as to render this requirement "practical
400
for law enforcement officials while providing adequate constitutional safeguards
to the motoring public. Indeed, the only arguable obstacle to law enforcement offi-
cials is providing proof of probable cause for operation of the sobriety check-
point.40 1 Without this requisite of proof, however, sobriety checkpoints must be
unconstitutional.
400. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972):
[T]he very heart of the Fourth Amendment directive [is] that, where practical, a governmental search and
seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judg-
ment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify [the] invasion . . . . Inherent in
the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a "neutral and detached magistrate."
Id. at 316 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,453 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
356 (1967)) (emphasis added).
401. Factors which a magistrate may deem persuasive in a determination of probable cause for the implementa-
tion of a sobriety checkpoint at a specified location include (1) the geographical proximity and relation of the
checkpoint to a "strip" on which there is located a number of establishments which serve alcoholic beverages, see
supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text, and (2) the existence of a high rate of arrest for drunken driving on a
particularly described length of a certain roadway, see supra notes 354-59 and accompanying text.
The Court has long-recognized that facts peculiar to a specific geographical location may be sufficient in them-
selves to establish probable cause. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160-61 (1925), the Court found that
the arresting officers had probable cause to stop suspected bootleggers seen traveling on a highway known to be
one highly-traveled by bootleggers and frequently patrolled in search of bootleggers. The Court noted:
"It has been very justly observed at the bar that the court is bound to take notice of public facts and geo-
graphical positions, and that this remote part of the country has been infested, at different periods, by
smugglers, is matter of general notoriety, and may be gathered from the public documents of the govern-
ment."
Id. at 159-60 (quoting The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 374 (1824)) (emphasis added).
Little alteration need be made to Justice Story's quoted passage from The Apollon to evidence the applicabil-
ity of "geographical location" in the context of the establishment of probable cause at sobriety checkpoints. Con-
sider:
"It has been very justly observed at the bar that the court is bound to take notice of [records of arrest rates
for driving under the influence and drunken-driving accidents] and [geographical locations in which there
is a high rate of occurrence of these incidents], and that this [particular X mile stretch of road] has been
infested, [particularly on week-end nights], by [drunken drivers], is matter of general notoriety, and may
be gathered from the public documents of the government."
Id.
See Colorado v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 489 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) ("[T]he location of the checkpoint was es-
tablished on a reasonable basis - information available to the State Patrol indicated that roads in the area of recrea-
tional sites near . . . Walden had been used by drunken drivers."); see State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131, 134
(N.J. Super. 1980) (checkpoint established "where many bars are located" found "sufficiently productive to qual-
ify as a reasonable law enforcement practice."). 'See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283
n.3 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Experience with an initial search or series of searches would be highly rele-
vant in considering applications for renewal of warrant.").
See supra notes 327, 353-58 and accompanying text.
Cf Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 538 (1967)) ("For purposes of an administrative search .... probable cause justifying the issuance of a
warrant may be based . . . on specific evidence of an existing violation [or] on a showing that 'reasonable legis-
lative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [es-
tablishment].' ") (footnote omitted). The author suggests that "a particular stretch of road" might be substituted in
the quoted passage for "a particular establishment" with insignificant impact on the impetus of the Court's find-
ing. The prevalent considerations in the Court's decision, irrespective of the context in which applied, is that
probable cause for an administrative search may be established by (1) direct evidence of a violation or, (2) show-
ing that the search will be specifically limited to a particular location and carried-out in accord with reasonable
standards established for executing the search.
But see State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Idaho 1988) (requisite individualized suspicion not found
where "site was selected because it was an area having a history of alcohol-related traffic violations as well as
being a street with heavy traffic.").
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To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the
totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of law-
lessness. But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the people through a
constitutional amendment .42
402. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
